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Abstract 
Purpose: The increasing level of connectivity is transforming supply chains, and it creates new 
opportunities but also new risks in the cyber space. Hence, cyber supply chain risk management 
(CSCRM) is emerging as a new management construct. The purpose of this paper is to explore how 
companies approach the management of cyber and information risks in their supply chain, what 
initiatives they adopt to this aim, and to what extent along the supply chain. The ultimate aim is to 
help organizations in understanding and improving the CSCRM process and cyber resilience in their 
supply chains. 
Design/methodology/approach: This research relied on a qualitative approach based on a 
comparative case study analysis involving five large multinational companies with headquarters, or 
branches, in the UK. 
Findings: Results highlight the importance for CSCRM to shift the viewpoint from the traditional 
focus on companies’ internal information technology infrastructure, able to “firewall themselves” 
only, to the whole supply chain with a cross-functional approach; initiatives for CSCRM are mainly 
adopted to “respond” and “recover” without a well-rounded approach to supply chain resilience for a 
long-term capacity to adapt to changes according to an evolutionary approach. Initiatives are adopted 
at a firm/dyadic level, and a network perspective is missing.  
Research limitations/implications: This paper extends the current theory on cyber and information 
risks in supply chains, as a combination of supply chain risk management and resilience, and 
information risk management. It provides an analysis and classification of cyber and information risks, 
sources of risks and initiatives to managing them according to a supply chain perspective, along with 
an investigation of their adoption across the supply chain. It also studies how the concept of resilience 
has been deployed in the CSCRM process by companies. By laying the empirical foundations of the 
subject, our study stimulates further research on the challenges and drivers of initiatives and 
coordination mechanisms for CSCRM at a supply chain network level. 
Practical implications: Results invite companies to break the “silos” of their activities in CSCRM, 
embracing the whole supply chain network for better resilience. The adoption of information 
technology security initiatives should be combined with organizational ones and extended beyond the 
dyad. Where applicable, initiatives should be bi-directional to involve supply chain partners, remove 
the typical isolation in the CSCRM process, and leverage the value of information. Decisions on 
investments in CSCRM should involve also supply chain managers according to a holistic approach. 
Originality/value: A supply chain perspective in the existing scientific contributions is missing in the 
management of cyber and information risk. This is one of the first empirical studies dealing with this 
interdisciplinary subject, focusing on risks that are now very high in the companies’ agenda, but still 
overlooked. It contributes to theory on information risk since it addresses cyber and information risks 
in massively connected supply chains through a holistic approach that includes technology, people 
and processes at an extended level that goes beyond the dyad. 
Keywords: Supply chain risk management, Cyber risk, Information risk, Cyber security, Supply 
chain management, Supply chain resilience 
Article classification: research paper 
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Introduction 
Over the last decades the expansion and importance of supply chain management has paralleled the 
growing ability of technology to exploit the benefits of information sharing for reducing costs, and 
concurrently improving customer satisfaction across business operations (Linton et al., 2014). Supply 
chains are increasingly operating in a massively connected global environment, where connectivity 
and integration happens among people, processes and devices through information and communication 
technologies (ICT) (Vanpoucke et al., 2017).  
ICT tools and systems such as the Internet, electronic communication protocols (e.g. electronic data 
interchange – EDI), mobile and cloud computing and paradigms such as the Internet of Things (IoT – 
referring to sensors, machines and people connected in dynamic network infrastructures) have the 
potential to completely change the way operations planning, monitoring and execution are carried out 
(Ben-Daya et al., 2017). The connectivity of supply chains and the digitalization of processes have led 
to the emergence of the so-called “cyber supply chain”, defined as “a supply chain enhanced by cyber-
based technologies to establish an effective value chain” (Kim and Im, 2014). The end-to-end flow of 
data provides visibility at all levels of the supply chain, for better process coordination, efficiency and 
effectiveness (Caridi et al., 2014). 
Unfortunately, for every good use of an innovation, there is someone looking to take advantage of its 
vulnerabilities. Warren and Hutchinson (1990) flagged cyber and information risks as supply chain 
related issues. As an example, a cyber-attack took place over a two year period beginning in 2011 at 
the port of Antwerp in Belgium, where a Dutch-based trafficking group hid cocaine and heroin among 
legitimate cargoes. The organised crime group allegedly used hackers based in Belgium to infiltrate 
computer networks in companies operating in the port of Antwerp. This allowed hackers to access 
secure data giving them the location and security details of containers, meaning the traffickers could 
send in lorry drivers to steal the cargo before the legitimate owner arrived (Bateman, 2013).  
Besides representing threats for the society coming from an activity within the supply chain, these 
cyber-attacks have considerable implications for organizations too. In fact, as an additional example, 
in summer 2017 a major international shipping line had a high-profile cyber-attack. In addition to 
having an estimated cost for the company’s operations up to $300 million, this attack had serious 
repercussions on the operations of their clients, who found their shipments stranded on uncontrollable 
and inaccessible vessels. Interestingly, these clients claimed that they had ICT security measures in 
place to “firewall themselves”, but clearly not their supply chain (Williams, 2017). 
All of this shows that in today’s environment of massive connectivity of supply chains, relying on ICT 
and technical security solutions to “firewall organizations” is not sufficient, differently from what it 
could have expected. In fact, threats and attacks could involve partners upstream and downstream in 
the supply chain and have negative impacts on the focal company, even if “perfectly” protected against 
cyber-attacks.  
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This constitutes an interesting and thought-provoking fact that invites one to reflect on the necessity 
for organizations to go beyond the technical level to confront cyber risks, and to adopt a different 
approach that allows for deeply embracing the interconnected nature of supply chains. As a response, 
cyber supply chain risk management (CSCRM) is emerging as a new “management construct resulting 
from the fusion of approaches, methods, and practices from the fields of cyber security, information 
risk management, and supply chain management” (Boyson, 2014). This construct requires a cross 
functional approach combining appropriate capabilities, technical expertise and human factors across 
the supply chain to avoid and confront disruptions coming from the massive connectivity of today’s 
systems’ operations (Bartol, 2014).  
In the current theory on the management of cyber and information risks a true supply chain perspective 
is missing. Traditionally, the literature has focussed on cyber and information risks from a technical 
and security perspective (Gaudenzi and Siciliano, 2017), within individual organizations (Biener et al., 
2015). Several literature contributions highlight the need for a more holistic approach to deal with 
cyber and information risks for organizations from a management perspective (e.g. Soomro et al., 
2016). 
Hence, studies on the end-to-end interactions among supply chain players operating in a more open 
and integrated world need to be undertaken to unveil current issues that firms have to cope with in 
terms of the level of cyber risk in relation to overall supply chain risk (Linton et al., 2014). Moreover, 
a substantial dearth of empirical evidence is highlighted in the current body of knowledge. Empirically 
proven best practices need to be shared for developing managerial approaches and tools for 
empowering organizations in the management of cyber and information risks in their supply chains 
(Boyson, 2014). New ways for strategically managing cyber risk could lead to enhanced cyber 
resilience as a result, by leveraging those principles essential for building a resilient supply chain 
(Ribeiro and Barbosa-Povoa, 2018). 
Given this background, this study aims at pushing the boundaries of supply chain research and practice, 
by extending the existing theory on cyber and information risks in supply chains, as a combination of 
SCRM and resilience, and information risk management. This area, as explained above, is currently 
underdeveloped and in need of further exploration, especially in terms of extending supply chain 
knowledge beyond a dyadic perspective. 
Hence, we present the results of an empirical investigation on cyber and information risks in supply 
chains. This work is based on multiple case studies of companies operating in connected supply chains 
where the cyber space links players beyond tier 1. The specific purpose of this paper is to explore how 
companies approach the management of cyber and information risks in their supply chain, what 
initiatives they currently adopt to this aim, and to what extent along the supply chain. For the purpose 
of this study, we investigate the CSCRM process of companies; we stretch our view beyond the dyad 
and tier 1 to understand the mechanisms of these phenomena and how far an end-to-end approach is 
adopted with players upstream and downstream in their supply chain. By collecting empirical evidence, 
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it also aims at offering organizations insights to understanding and enhancing the management of 
cyber and information risks in their supply chains for better resilience. Simultaneously, it allows 
embracing the challenges posed by rapidly changing technologies that directly affect supply chain 
management. 
The contribution of the present study is important to the advancement of both theory and practice on 
the investigated topic, in that it furthers our understanding by presenting a combination of the various 
disciplines and by offering novel and unique insights thanks to the collection of field evidence. Our 
original findings complement the existing theory by offering new knowledge on the approaches to 
cyber and information risk management by companies; they also enrich practice by informing the 
industry on the end-to-end interactions among supply chain players when cyber and information risk 
management initiatives are considered. This lays the foundations to stimulate further research too.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The following section presents the theoretical 
background of the study, while the adopted research methodology is described subsequently. The 
findings of the empirical investigation are then reported and discussed. Final remarks, implications and 
directions for future research conclude this paper.   
 
Theoretical background 
Consistently with the objectives of this research, we present a theoretical background focused on the 
areas investigated in this work: supply chain risk management and resilience, information risk 
management, and CSCRM (including cyber and information risk in supply chains and related sources, 
and initiatives to manage this kind of risk). We conclude this section with the research gaps arising 
from our literature review. 
 
Supply chain risk management and resilience 
Few areas of management interest have risen to prominence in recent years as rapidly as supply chain 
risk management (SCRM), due to the turbulence of the business environment, volatile and variable 
consumer demands, along with actions by competitors (Christopher and Holweg, 2011). A definition 
of supply chain risk is “the variation in the distribution of possible supply chain outcomes, their 
likelihoods, and their subjective values” (Jüttner et al., 2003). This definition points at the dimensions 
of risk, i.e. probability of occurrence and impact on business, originally proposed by the traditional 
risk management literature (March and Shapira, 1987). According to Tang (2006), supply chain risks 
can be classified into “disruption” and “operational”. Disruption risks are related to natural and man-
made disaster, while operational risks are connected to the uncertainty of supply and demand 
processes and price. Operational risks were further classified by Prasanna Venkatesan and Kumanan 
(2012), and include risks such as quality risk, capacity risk, supply and demand risk, exchange rate 
risk, and information flow risk.  
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The main aim of SCRM is to protect businesses from adverse events, through a process that is 
composed of four main phases, represented by risk identification, risk assessment, risk mitigation and 
risk monitoring (Ho et al., 2015). The first phase entails the identification of the risks and related 
sources; the second phase implies the assessment of the probability of occurrence of risky events and 
their impact on business; the third phase includes the design, selection and implementation of 
strategies and tools to manage and mitigate the negative effects of potential risks; the fourth phase 
requires the implementation of abnormality diagnosis models and other metrics and measures to early 
detect potential signals of risk and act upon them.  
Besides arranging the SCRM process internally to the organization (by setting appropriate 
ownership/level of centralization of decisions), a coordinated approach among supply chain members 
is deemed as essential to manage supply chain risk and enhance supply chain resilience (Colicchia and 
Strozzi, 2012; Chowdhury and Quaddus, 2016; Ribeiro and Barbosa-Povoa, 2018). This coordinated 
approach should encompass both proactive and reactive measures to achieve resilience, which 
respectively refer to the concepts of robustness and agility (Wieland and Wallenburg, 2013).  
Various definitions of supply chain resilience have been proposed and revolve around the idea of 
restoring the state of operations (Ribeiro and Barbosa-Povoa, 2018). In this respect, Davoudi (2012) 
discusses three views on resilience: engineering resilience as the ability of a system to return to an 
equilibrium or steady-state after a disturbance; ecological resilience which instead proposes the 
existence of multiple equilibria, and the possibility of systems to enter alternative stability domains; 
and evolutionary resilience, which moves away from the concept of equilibrium and affirms that 
systems might change over time with or without an external disturbance. In this sense, Davoudi (2012) 
proposes resilience as the capacity to adapt to all types of changes in a continuous way, since today’s 
world is seen as a chaotic and uncertain environment.   
Given this view of the world, supply chain resilience is composed of a set of adaptive responses in a 
multi-stage approach. If according to Ribeiro and Barbosa-Povoa (2018) these responses are triggered 
by potential risky events, Davoudi (2012) specifies that responses are generated by the continuous 
tensions deriving from changes in complex and uncertain systems, which require a continuously 
adaptive response. This approach should embrace different phases: prepare, respond, recover and 
maintain, where “maintain” also means a long-term adaptive capacity. Hence, the concept of supply 
chain resilience needs to combine proactive and anticipating actions with plans and planned steps to 
respond to incidents and maintain not only a steady-state solution after the recovery from a disruption, 
but a continuously adaptive approach to changes in today’s complex and uncertain systems (Davoudi, 
2012; Hohenstein et al., 2015; Ribeiro and Barbosa-Povoa, 2018).  
The literature discusses enablers and barriers to supply chain resilience. The main identified enablers 
are: flexibility, supply chain visibility, collaboration/coordination among supply chain partners by 
means of communicative and cooperative relationships (Wieland and Wallenburg, 2013), joint 
relationship efforts (Scholten and Schilder, 2015; Ali et al., 2017). Whilst, the main identified barriers 
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are: misalignment of objectives within and among the partnering firms, along with lack of visibility, 
collaboration and trust (Ali et al., 2017), which are affected by the presence of behavioural 
uncertainty among people in the supply chain (Dubei et al., 2017).  
To achieve resilience in supply chains, it is necessary to identify the right fit between a company’s 
level of risk in the supply chain and its preparedness in risk management. This can be seen also from 
the perspective of investments in supply chain risk management initiatives. In this regard, Pettit et al. 
(2013), and Gualandris and Kalchschmidt (2015) introduce the concept of “balanced resilience”. This 
concept represents the right fit between the level of riskiness of a certain supply chain configuration 
and the related amount of investment in the SCRM process, appropriate to adequately confront that 
level of riskiness and to continuously adapt to changes. Ambulkar et al. (2015) discuss the 
implications for resources’ configuration in firms when contexts of high disruption impact or low 
disruption impact are concerned. 
The literature reveals that it might not be possible to implement resilience driven actions in an isolated 
form. In fact, in connected and complex supply chain networks with several tiers that create 
dependency, resilience strategies should be devised together with supply chain partners and rely on 
knowledge created and shared across the supply chain (Ribeiro and Barbosa-Povoa, 2018). This 
should be aimed at building that long-term adaptive capacity that makes the whole supply chain more 
resilient to the continuous changes and inner tensions of today’s complex systems according to an 
evolutionary view (Davoudi, 2012). This would also allow embracing the concept of risk propagation 
at a network level (Han and Shin, 2016). In other words, risks can migrate across the supply network, 
and for this reason it is necessary to adopt a holistic approach to resilience because of the strong 
interconnectedness of players along the supply chain (Tukamuhabwa et al., 2017). 
 
Information risk management 
Information is an element widely acknowledged as a competitive advantage source for organizations 
(Daugherty et al., 2006). It can give power and insight (Trombley, 2015), and it allows for integration 
and coordination in the supply chain when data are shared in a controlled way (Wang et al., 2008; 
Boulesnane and Bouzidi, 2013). Seminal works defined information as “the substance from which the 
managerial decisions are made” (Forrester, 1962). Managing information in a proper way is a 
challenging task for organizations, due to increased volume, speed of transmission and growing 
variety of types of information and data. Moreover, threats to information are rising and similarly 
concerns about how to manage these risks (Trombley, 2015). 
“Information risk” can be defined as “the probability of loss arising because of incorrect, incomplete, 
or illegal access to information” (Faisal et al., 2007) that can undermine its security. Information risk 
is in fact tightly connected to the concept of information security (Trombley, 2015). Numerous 
frameworks for managing risks to information and technology resources have been proposed in the 
academic and technical literature: the ISO standards on risk management (ISO 31000, ISO 31010) and 
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information security management (ISO 27000); the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the 
Treadway Commission (COSO) (Yeo et al., 2014); the NIST standards for risk management and 
information security (Bartol, 2014). Alongside, a considerable body of knowledge has focused on the 
management of information risks and related security issues for organizations.  
However, from an overall analysis of the extant literature, it appears that research on information risk 
and security has been dominated by technical aspects (Karlsson et al., 2016), and information security 
management was treated as a technical issue (Singh et al., 2013). Hence, the majority of the attention 
was given to technological solutions (Soomro et al., 2016). Some contributions studied the return on 
investments on security technology and initiatives, such as intrusion detection systems and anti-virus 
protection, as well as technologies used to protect the confidentiality and integrity of data (Yeo et al., 
2014). These include cryptography solutions and secure multi-party computation, which has the aim 
to create methods for parties to ensure a secure collaboration and process information while keeping 
identities private (Prabhakaran and Sahai, 2013). Hao and Cai (2011) proposed a cloud model to 
provide “a confidential and verifiable environment for each sensitive application”. Generic technical 
solutions also exist, such as access controls solutions (Chen et al., 2007; Santos-Pereira et al., 2013) 
and virus propagation models (Yuan et al., 2009). 
Research also discussed the fact that technology alone is unable to provide enough solutions to 
address organisational information security concerns and needs (Singh et al., 2013). Consequently 
literature has started to focus on a balanced approach of technical, human and organizational factors 
(Soomro et al., 2016). Examples of this category of initiatives include: internal audit processes (Yeo 
et al., 2014); information security policies (Siponen et al., 2014); policies to countermeasure 
information asymmetry among different departments within an organization (Kumar et al., 2008); 
compliance training schemes to create information security awareness and drive the behaviour of 
employees (Parsons et al., 2014).  
Nevertheless, from the reviewed literature it appears that information risk management efforts are 
generally focussed within the boundaries of the organization or, on a much lesser scale, on inter-
organizational dyadic connections between companies (Karlsson et al., 2016). Hence, the literature 
advocates for a more holistic approach to information risk management (Soomro et al., 2016). 
 
The new management construct of cyber supply chain risk management 
Building on Boysons’s (2014) definition, CSCRM includes the strategy and initiatives focusing on the 
assessment and mitigation of cyber and information risks across the end-to-end operations of a supply 
chain (Boyson, 2014). Differently from a traditional approach to information risk management, 
CSCRM entails a holistic approach that combines processes, people and technology to embrace a 
“relationship dimension” (Spekman and Davis, 2004). This is intended to enable a high level of 
integration that extends to supply chain partners beyond the dyad or single points of interface between 
supply chain partners.  
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The aim of CSCRM is to gain control within the boundaries of the focal company and on inter-
organizational dyadic connections between companies, but most importantly, building upon this, to 
gain control at an end-to-end supply chain level that allows for a continuously adaptive capacity. This 
holistic approach should lead to better resilience related to cyber and information risk according to an 
evolutionary view.  
The challenge is that the process of CSCRM has to deal with increasing complexity of supply chains. 
This is linked to the number of suppliers in an organization’s supply base (horizontal complexity), to 
the number of tiers in that supply chain (vertical complexity), and to the geographical spread of a 
company and/or supply base (spatial complexity) (Bode and Wagner, 2015). To add to this growing 
supply chain complexity, market behaviours, configurations and often non-transparent supply chain 
partners’ identities in the cyber space are constantly changing (Bartol, 2014; Linton et al., 2014).  
Risky events can happen also in stages of the supply chain distant from the focal company and have a 
knock-down effect on the entire supply chain (Williams, 2017). Hence, the extended holistic approach 
through CSCRM is deemed as essential to confront the mentioned challenges towards enhanced cyber 
resilience.  
According to the abovementioned concept of balanced resilience, the CSCRM process needs to take 
into account the level of supply chain risk contingent to different contexts and sectors. This should be 
something similar to what happens when different supply chain configurations are explored and 
devised to fit with the characteristics of products and related demand (Fisher, 1997; Fine, 2000). In this 
way it would be possible to achieve the so-called “strategic fit” (Wagner et al., 2012). In a similar 
fashion, the proneness of the supply chain to cyber risks in terms of probability and impact needs to be 
taken into account when planning appropriate investments to confront these risks to achieve balanced 
resilience. This would entail also the adoption of performance measurement systems for turbulence 
and risk management to facilitate the achievement of enhanced resilience for organizations (Bühler et 
al., 2016). 
 
Cyber and information risk in supply chains 
According to Zuo and Hu (2009), the main information risks in a supply chain include: risk to 
information confidentiality, which relates to the potential loss of control over sensitive 
information/data across the supply chain; risk to information privacy, which relates to the potential 
misuse of data out of the principal purpose of releasing data by the data owner; risk to information 
integrity, which relates to the potential corruption and damaging of data/information stored in IT 
systems across the supply chain network.  
The cyber supply chain offers numerous levels of targets for breach and corruption. This can result in 
customers, suppliers and employees records compromised (WEF, 2014; BCI, 2015), breach and 
disclosure of sensitive data on processes, products, data flows, governance and operations (Boyson, 
2014). Literature also discusses the risk of theft of intellectual property and counterfeits aimed at 
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gaining financial advantage over the focal company/supply chain (WEF, 2014; Stevenson and Busby, 
2015). Another risk debated in the literature is represented by the problems connected to the IT 
systems such as the crash of websites and the failure of companies’ IT networks, leading to the 
unavailability of critical services (BCI, 2015).  
Basing on the previous literature, we propose a classification of the sources of cyber and information 
risks in the supply chain (see Table 1), built on two dimensions: the location of the source of risk in 
the supply chain (i.e. internal to the focal company or external to it) and the nature of the source of 
risk (i.e. malicious attacks or natural and non-intentional actions). The necessity to distinguish 
between internal and external sources of risk is essential given that internal sources of risks are 
progressively gaining importance: fraud by employees is common and difficult to detect, stop or 
prevent (Boyson, 2014). Both current and former employees can represent a threat to organizations. 
Distinguishing between current and former employees stresses the different level of control on these 
sources, because it is usually more difficult to track the actions of former employees who might still 
have retention of relevant data/information but who operate externally to the company (PwC, 2014). 
While in several occasions employees deliberately act against the interests of their own employers, 
some cases are related to non-intentional actions that include forwarding of infected messages, 
sharing of passwords or account details, replying to phishing messages, retrieving and storing data on 
portable and uncontrolled devices (PwC, 2014). Employees are progressively becoming the vehicle 
for malicious attacks: this happens through the so-called “social engineering” techniques, which 
involve tricking human beings into breaking companies’ common security procedures and divulgating 
confidential information (Happ et al., 2016). Recent research points at phishing and social 
engineering as the top source of cyber disruption (BCI, 2016).  
Externally, the sources of cyber and information risks lie in the various tiers of the supply chain 
(Boyson, 2014), in most cases beyond the Tier 1 and affect the entire network (BCI, 2015): current 
and former suppliers/contractors, customers and competitors contribute to expose the supply chain to 
cyber and information risks through both malicious and non-intentional attacks. These mainly include 
actions related to the sharing and transmission of information and data across multiple stages of the 
supply chain, which are not always happening through secure communication channels/methods 
(Barkataki and Zeineddine, 2015). Likewise, the points of interface among supply chain partners are 
vulnerable to cyber-attacks, especially when they concentrate large international flows of products 
and related information: for example seaports are particularly exposed to advanced persistent threats 
(APT) by criminal activities due to the increased use of mobile devices (Rushmere, 2015) and data 
transmission (Yang and Wei, 2013). Also foreign nation states, domestic intelligence 
services/espionage and hacker/hactivists represent a source of risk coming from malicious attacks, 
through actions connected to broader societal implications (Luiijf et al., 2013).  
Among the natural and non-intentional sources of cyber and information risks, literature includes 
factors such as power outages and technical problems to the IT infrastructure. These can be both 
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internal and external to the focal company, causing failures that compromise the operations and the 
flow of information across multiple tiers (Intel Security, 2014). Finally, natural disasters are also 
mentioned as external and non-intentional sources of risk (Boyson, 2014).  
Existing literature stresses the importance of investigating the perceptions of these new threats to the 
value creation in companies, as explained by the work of Gaudenzi and Siciliano (2017), who showed 
that there is very little awareness of what these risks are and to what kind of sources they are linked. 
This calls for further investigations on this underexplored theme. 
 
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 
 
Table 1. Sources of cyber and information risks in the supply chain 
 
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 
 
Initiatives to manage cyber and information risk in supply chains 
In order to understand the tools and instruments available to companies for implementing a CSCRM 
process, we present a review of the initiatives to managing cyber and information risks in the supply 
chain. The current literature has explored the development and implementation of security safeguards 
and initiatives for addressing the described concerns. The reviewed initiatives were aggregated to 
create homogeneous clusters and in doing this, we identified a link that connects them with the 
sources of risk they aim at counteracting.  
 
Security safeguards and initiatives include: 
• Organizational initiatives: these initiatives have as a first focal point the alignment of the 
information security strategy with the overarching strategy and specific needs of the business 
(Bartol, 2014). Standards and protocols have been developed to improve the mentioned 
strategic alignment and to provide regulatory guidelines, e.g. ISO27000 and NIST SP 800-
161 (Bartol, 2014; Keegan, 2014). This could also lead to the establishment of a chief 
information security officer position in companies (Boyson, 2014) and to the introduction of 
security entrance barriers such as personnel background checks (Kim and Im, 2014). Also, 
cyber insurance products have been proposed to specifically tackle cyber threats 
(Mukhopadhyay et al., 2013), even if their adoption is still in its infancy (BCI, 2015). This is 
confirmed by the work of Biener et al. (2015), who stress the fact that the cyber risk insurance 
market lags behind the expectations of companies. This is also due to the internal perceptions 
related to the capability of the existing insurance products to protect organizations from 
highly interrelated losses, lack of data, and severe information asymmetries. These problems 
12 
 
hinder the development of a sustainable cyber insurance market. Given their broad focus, this 
group of initiatives has a pervasive effect and are aimed at counteracting all sources of risks.   
• Training and internal awareness: training and awareness programmes for employees are 
essential for good “cyber hygiene”. O’Connell (2012) define it as the process of “educating 
everyone legitimately relying on the Internet on good network usage practices”. These 
initiatives are critical to educate and up-skill the human capital in companies to enhance 
resilience and prevent, detect and respond to internal threats in supply chains (Boyson, 2014). 
In fact, it is necessary to strengthen staff awareness in order to help directors and top 
management in driving choices regarding security investment and supplier selection to better 
security (BCI, 2016). Likewise, employees need to be aware of the potential implications of 
their choices mainly in terms of usage of security tools, especially when performance and 
security trade-offs are involved (Intel Security, 2014). Training and awareness programmes 
are aimed at hunting trust assumptions and ineptitude when unpalatable courses of action 
might be necessary to ensure a higher degree of security in processes and operations 
(Windelberg, 2016). This is connected to the perceptions of employees regarding motivations 
internal to the company or related to their personal beliefs environment. Also motivations 
external to the company (coming from the wider environment) can trigger compliant or non-
compliant behaviours towards cyber security (Bulgurcu et al., 2010). Along these lines, the 
study by Ifinedo (2012) showed that factors such as self-efficacy, attitude toward compliance, 
subjective norms, response efficacy and perceived vulnerability positively influence 
behavioural compliance intentions of employees. Procedures for protecting intellectual 
property are also seen as critical in the literature (Stevenson and Busby, 2015), including safe 
and controlled sharing of data and information across multiple tiers of the supply chain (WEF, 
2014). This group of initiatives are especially aimed at counteracting the sources of risk 
coming from people working within the company, i.e. current employees. 
• Compliance and external awareness: being that today’s supply chains are strongly interlinked 
and massively connected, it is necessary that supply chain partners are made sufficiently 
aware of the threats and risks coming from the cyber space to increase the resilience of inter-
entity business processes to cyber disruptions (Tran et al., 2016). This could happen through 
appropriate supply chain coordination mechanisms as suggested by the literature (Pilbeam et 
al., 2012; Herrera and Janczewsky, 2015). Supply chain coordination can be achieved through: 
alignment, intended as the development of a collective strategy among supply chain partners, 
along with a common culture and shared norms and processes (Hanf and Dautzenberg, 2006; 
Pradabwong et al., 2017); synchronization, intended as a tool enabling effective information-
sharing among supply chain partners and supporting decision making especially during 
disruption responses (Soni et al., 2014; Singh et al., 2018); shared knowledge, i.e. sharing of 
experiences among supply chain partners after disruptions are overcome with the aim to 
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create post-incident reports accessible to all supply chain partners (Tao et al., 2016). This is 
also referred to as mutually-created knowledge (Scholten and Schilder, 2015). In the context 
of this study, this is translated into a set of specific initiatives. It is important for companies to: 
(i) require customers and suppliers/contractors to comply with their privacy and security 
policies, by adhering to security protocols and guidelines (Eurich et al., 2010) to achieve 
alignment; (ii) conduct supply chain partner security audits (BCI, 2015) and 
qualification/operational checks (Boyson, 2014) to ensure that the third party has the ability to 
safeguard and share the information and is protecting the data (PwC, 2014), according to the 
principle of synchronization; (iii) establish collaborative agreements with supply chain 
partners on security (Kim and Im, 2014) to create an end-to-end IT integration including 
supply chain policies, processes and people (Boyson, 2014) to reinforce synchronization and 
to improve “threat intelligence” (PwC, 2014) through shared knowledge. Given their focus, 
this group of initiatives are especially aimed at counteracting the sources of risk coming from 
partners in the supply chain, i.e. suppliers and customers. 
• Event management: this category of measures mainly refers to ways in which organizations 
can respond to cyber and information risk events. This category contributes to the 
achievement of supply chain coordination through the so-called situational awareness. 
Literature defines this concept as “an individually as well as socially cognitive state of 
understanding ‘the big picture’ during critical situations” (Sarter and Woods, 1991). It enables 
mechanisms supporting companies’ willingness to share information in order to create trust 
among supply chain partners (Tao et al., 2016). It also contributes to a “common baseline of 
the current conditions” available to partners and exchanged among them, so that actions can 
be undertaken as quickly as possible (Sheffi, 2005). Initiatives include business continuity 
and disaster recovery plans (BCI, 2016) and incident management processes (WEF, 2014). 
These measures need to be validated and agreed with supply chain partners. According to the 
principle of situational awareness, specific initiatives such as communication procedures with 
involved supply chain partners are essential for improving the timeliness and effectiveness of 
responses to events and of recovery from incidents (BCI, 2016). These should be coupled also 
with initiatives that embrace information systems continuity management approaches 
(Järveläinen, 2013), which can help to identify the dependencies between internal and 
external systems and supply chain players. Plans, analyses and continuity processes involve 
supply chain players and not only IT experts, leveraging their perceptions to positively affect 
the effectiveness of these practices on perceived business impacts (Järveläinen, 2013). These 
initiatives are focused on the risky events themselves, independently from who/what triggers 
the risky event, so they can address all sources of risk. 
• Data management: managing access to data is of vital importance for companies in protecting 
themselves from cyber risks. The foundation of a secure data management approach is to 
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build and maintain an accurate record of all the employees accessing and handling data. A 
critical success factor will be the identification of the suitable/trusted people that could access 
data. The answer to this question leads to the allocation of access permissions and privileges 
to different categories of users (Trombley, 2015). Secure data access and control measures 
complying with the devised information security strategy and fulfilling the specific business 
requirements, need to be put in place to identify sensitive assets, detect and prevent the 
leakage of confidential information (Eurich et al., 2010). This group of categories specifically 
focuses on the handling of data and information by employees, and consequently represents 
ways in which the behaviours/tasks of current and former employees can be contained. 
• IT security tools: todays companies’ IT systems have a range of security tools to protect from 
cyber intrusions, spanning from encryption of e-mail messages (Bartol, 2014), intrusion 
prevention systems (IPS), data loss prevention tools (PwC, 2014), geo-location and geo-
fencing controls (firewall and virtual private networks) (Secci and Murugesan, 2014), data 
and URL filtering (antivirus and antispam) (Intel Security, 2014). Some of these tools feature 
detection functionalities, which report on malicious codes, unauthorized use or access. 
Similarly, mobile security strategy and device management are essential to securing a fleet of 
devices, whether owned by the enterprise or the individual (PwC, 2014). Given their focus, 
aimed at protecting the supply chain from vulnerabilities and attacks, this group of initiatives 
counteracts sources of risks including current and former employees and external sources, 
such as suppliers, customers, competitors, foreign nation states, domestic intelligence services, 
and hackers/hacktivists.   
• IT operational resilience: this category of initiatives include actions aimed at ensuring 
continuity to the IT operations across the supply chain. They revolve around hardware and 
systems architecture resilience and recovery capabilities. They refer to measures connected to 
the IT system failure management across the supply chain, through actions such as recovery 
plan processes, both internal and externally involving supply chain partners (Boyson, 2014; 
BCI, 2015). They also include measures for improving operational resilience through IT 
systems and solutions, such as multiple data backup, geographical distributed datacentres, 
virtual networks/IT infrastructures, uninterruptible power supplies/power banks (Secci and 
Murugesan, 2014), and cloud systems orchestrators able to isolate a company’s network in 
case of cyber-attack penetration, concurrently offering continuity of operations on a separated 
cloud network (BCI, 2016). Given their operational resilience and continuity focus, this group 
of initiatives especially counteract those sources such as technical problems, natural disasters, 
power outages and external attackers. 
 
From an overall view, the set of initiatives to CSCRM reflect the modern concept of supply chain 
resilience, which is composed of a set of adaptive responses in a multi-stage approach (Ribeiro and 
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Barbosa-Povoa, 2018). In fact, the above initiatives include actions aimed at ensuring adequate 
response to disruptions (e.g. event management), complemented by actions covering all phases of the 
multi-stage approach discussed in the literature, i.e. prepare, respond, recover and maintain. For 
example, “Training and internal awareness” initiatives allow for preparing employees and 
empowering them to manage potential incidents, drive recovery plus maintenance of a robust state 
and, according to an evolutionary view (Davoudi, 2012), to develop a long-term adaptive capacity to 
face the continuous changes and inner tensions in today’s complex and uncertain environment. 
Furthermore, this set of initiatives encompasses the need to stretch beyond the boundaries of the focal 
company and of dyadic relationships to avoid those issues related to isolation highlighted by the 
literature as impeding elements to building a cyber resilient supply chain. 
 
Research gaps 
The review of the existing body of knowledge allowed broadly exploring the uniqueness of the 
concept of CSCRM and its components, building upon literature on supply chain risk and resilience, 
and information risk management. It also emerged that information risk management in supply chains 
is a field which has not been extensively researched, although its importance is well recognized in the 
supply chain management literature (Sharma and Routroy, 2016; Rajagopal et al., 2017).  
In performing the review, we aimed at systematizing and rationalizing the existing contributions on the 
investigated topic, grouping previous works in the thematic categories presented in the previous pages. 
This effort allowed appreciating that the extant literature appears to be scattered, and covers in a 
piecemeal fashion a very wide range of topics and fields. These span from technical IT studies, to 
investigations on standards and protocols, to contributions focused on organizational issues. Also, 
research on risks, sources of risks and initiatives to manage them in the cyber space exist, but again 
these are investigated within specific studies focused on single themes or technical contexts and do not 
embrace the concept of supply chain resilience as a whole.  
As mentioned, given the growth of the level of connectedness of supply chains worldwide, and the 
emerging need for managing cyber and information risks in the supply chain, cohesive and 
comprehensive studies on the topic are necessary to include a cross-functional holistic approach in the 
supply chain at a network level (Bartol, 2014; Soomro et al., 2016). Traditionally cyber and 
information risks were prerogative of information security or software engineering practitioners.  
Recent literature acknowledges the need for a cross-functional holistic approach to manage them in 
the supply chain. This approach should look at the interactions between processes, people and 
information technology (Intel Security, 2014; Secci and Murugesan, 2014), and at the coordination 
mechanisms that allow supply chain partners to adopt an end-to-end approach beyond the dyad 
(Herrera and Janczewski, 2015).  
However, our review of the existing literature shows that this need has yet to be fulfilled in a holistic 
and cohesive way. It also shows the need for providing the scientific and industrial communities with 
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empirical evidence aimed at advancing the knowledge and managerial practice on the topic of 
CSCRM for building a resilient supply chain. In fact, a substantial dearth of empirical studies on 
cyber and information risk management conducted according to the abovementioned perspectives has 
been highlighted by previous research (Boyson, 2014; Karlsson et al., 2016) and thus further 
empirical studies are called for by the managerial implications of cyber-attacks shown in recent 
examples (e.g. Williams, 2017). These gaps provide the motivations for our study and offer to the 
authors the possibility to complement the existing body of knowledge by providing the academic 
community with the results of our study, especially shedding light on the managerial implications of 
the choices made by companies in terms of approaches to managing cyber and information risks, the 
adopted initiatives, and to what extent in the supply chain. Along with the objectives of this research, 
these gaps inform the design of our empirical investigation, described in the next section. 
 
Methodology 
The aim of this study is to contribute to the development of theory on CSCRM as a combination of 
SCRM and resilience, and information risk. This is a subject that needs further exploration as shown in 
the previous sections.  
As a consequence, we decided to adopt a qualitative research approach and selected a multiple case 
study investigation as a research method. Focused case studies are suitable for analyses of current 
phenomena including the social dimension, implanted in complex environments (Yin, 2018), being 
particularly recommendable to exploratory research on matters in need of a deeper understanding 
(Jüttner and Maklan, 2011).  
In fact, we believe that this research is part of the “mapping⁄relationship building stage of theory 
building” (Stuart et al. 2002), where we aim at identifying and describing critical factors and the 
relationships that drive behaviours (Golicic and Sebastiao, 2011). Also, by enabling direct interaction 
with people and informants, case research provides an advantage over other research techniques, such 
as surveys (Miles and Huberman, 1994). We present our research process following the steps 
recommended by standard case based research methodology: case selection, data collection, and data 
analysis and validation (Stuart et al., 2002). 
 
Case selection 
The case selection process was aimed at creating a diverse but coherent universe for our exploration on 
a focused matter (Robinson, 2014). The following three inclusion criteria were applied: 
(i) Companies operating at different stages of the supply chain. Given the supply chain perspective of 
this study, we decided to sample companies setting a quota of one supply chain actor for each supply 
chain stage, according to a quota sampling approach (Robinson, 2014). Hence, we decided to include 
one manufacturing/supplier company, one logistics service provider operating in the 
packaged/palletized goods sector, one logistics service provider operating in the bulk goods sector, one 
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shipping company and one retailer. In particular, the logistics service provider operating in the bulk 
sector and the shipping company were included as key stages of the supply chain to encompass the 
CSCRM process taking place in seaports, which are targeted for criminal activities due to the 
increased use of mobile devices (Rushmere, 2015). 
(ii) Large companies, which usually have structured supply chain processes and complex supply chain 
network relationships. Large companies typically have more technology in place, more mature security 
processes and intense activities in the cyber supply chain. They are often targeted by threat actors due 
to the large amount of information they manage and that can be exploited, sold or used (PwC, 2014). 
Hence they constitute an adequate territory of exploration for the purpose of this study. 
(iii) Multinational companies with headquarters or a branch in the UK. The purpose was to control for 
factors such as culture, language, legal system and economic environment through geographic location: 
factors such as regulations, legislation, and stakeholder pressure differ among countries and this could 
create relevant deviations in the exploratory results (Mena et al., 2013). 
Based on the above criteria, five companies constituted our sample. This decision is in line with the 
methodological literature on case study research, which acknowledges that four to 10 cases are 
generally sufficient to draw meaningful insights on the phenomena under investigation (Ellram, 1996). 
Moreover, we consider this number of case studies to be sufficient, given the purpose of our research 
(Strauss, 1987; McCracken, 1998).  
As for the nature of the selected companies, the adopted inclusion criteria allowed obtaining a sample 
of organizations that is not constrained by the typical specificities of a certain industry or of a certain 
type of supply chain. In fact, this could influence results and prevent one from obtaining a first 
understanding of the phenomena under investigation.  
For confidentiality reasons, the names of the case companies have not been disclosed and each 
company has been referred to by using an alphabetical letter. Table 2 gives an overview of the case 
companies, along with additional background information. 
 
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 
 
Table 2. Profile of the case companies 
 
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 
 
Data collection 
Following the literature review, we designed our data collection instrument and developed a formal 
interview protocol (Yin, 2018). It contains a mixture of open questions and multiple choice questions 
and it is composed of five main sections:  (1) Company profile, (2) The importance of managing 
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supply chain risks and cyber and information risks, (3) The SCRM process, (4) Cyber and information 
risks in the supply chain, (5) Initiatives to managing cyber and information risks in the supply chain. 
The questionnaire was designed with the aim to allow investigating the CSCRM process originating in 
the focal company and its branching across the supply chain towards customers and suppliers beyond 
the dyad and Tier 1. The specific questions focused on relationships that spread upstream and 
downstream across the supply chain and connect players beyond the dyad. Questions pointed at 
unveiling what happens when the CSCRM process is implemented and stretched beyond the dyad and 
Tier 1, to appreciate the underlying mechanisms in the relationships with partners upstream and 
downstream the supply chain.  
A pilot test was performed with a panel of academics and experts in the field of SCRM and 
information management. As a result, amendments were made on the wording of some questions so 
that they became clearer and more focused. The pilot test assisted in avoiding misinterpretations (Yin, 
2018), providing a solid questionnaire and a facilitated comparison of the cases. 
We identified the most suitable informants in each participating company: the supply chain 
manager/director and the information systems/technology director, which were both interviewed in 
each company (or the equivalent professional role). Two of the authors participated in each of the 
interviews at the companies’ premises. Interviews lasted approximately 1.5 hours each; they were 
audio recorded, transcribed and interview reports were prepared to enable data analysis. Reports and 
transcripts were included in a case study database. Websites and third party reports were analysed and 
the collected evidence was included in the case study database to enable triangulation. The use of 
multiple respondents and different types of data were intended to mitigate the biases of single sources 
of information (Miles and Huberman, 1994).  
The gathered information was matched with the recorded interview data to obtain a clear picture of the 
investigated phenomena. Interview reports were shared with the interviewees (Yin, 2018) and 
remaining discrepancies were resolved by recalling respondents via e-mails or phone calls. 
 
Data analysis and validation 
A within-case analysis allowed producing case study reports, which were shared with and reviewed by 
the key informants, as suggested by Yin (2018). Researchers first scanned the collected data and 
formalized coding, writing and reflecting remarks (Miles and Huberman, 1994). Templates were used, 
including charts and tables (Miles and Huberman, 1994; Crabtree and Miller, 1999). Patterns in the 
data were identified and categorized within the single cases. A subsequent cross case analysis was 
performed to search for emergent themes, patterns of commonality and key differences, by comparing 
the outcomes of the within-case analysis after coding data and generate the interpretations presented in 
the research findings (Miles and Huberman, 1994). 
In terms of validation of the outcomes of our research steps, we followed the practices recommended 
by established methodological literature. Empirical validity was assessed by means of the criteria 
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presented by Yin (2018), and made explicit in Table 3. Construct validity was ensured through the 
establishment of a chain of evidence linking the research objectives to the protocol and to the results 
(through the involvement of multiple informants to seek feedback and observations, and through the 
demonstration of the convergence of patterns from multiple data sources), and by developing our data 
collection tool on the basis of our literature. Internal validity was ensured through building our 
research on recognized principles of CSCRM and related literature, which acted as foundation to 
identify critical factors and relationships driving behaviours; also through a structured analysis of the 
collected data, the use of templates containing charts and tables, which helped in maintaining the chain 
of evidence, and through pattern matching within and across the cases, triangulating data, and reaching 
an agreement among researchers (Miles and Huberman, 1984; Yin, 2018). External validity was 
ensured by setting suitable sampling criteria driven by the research objectives, which allowed building 
a coherent and diverse sample, along with describing the context and the cases; also, we compared 
data gathered from companies operating in different supply chains and different stages of the supply 
chain. Reliability of the research was ensured on the rigour of the applied process (protocol developed 
and validated; clear and structured sampling criteria; shared interview protocol for all interviewers; 
creation of a database including the interviews and questionnaires), and on the level of detail provided 
in a formalized coding that involved multiple researchers: this allows for replicability of the study for 
future research.  
 
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 
 
Table 3. Assessment of the empirical validity of the research (based on Yin, 2018; and Reuter et al., 
2010) 
 
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 
 
 
Findings and discussions 
After describing in the previous section the adopted research methodology, in this section the 
empirical findings of this study are reported and depicted in Tables 4, 5, 6 and 7. We first present the 
outcomes of the within case analysis, according to a thematic template (Ellis et al., 2011; Gualandris 
and Kalchschmidt, 2014). For each company, the template includes: the key types of cyber and 
information risks and related sources as perceived by our respondents; the adopted approaches to 
SCRM and CSCRM; the initiatives currently in place within organizations to manage cyber and 
information risks in the supply chain. Subsequently, a cross case analysis is performed by 
concurrently looking at the outcomes of the within case analysis from an overall combined 
perspective, so that patterns, commonalities and key divergences can emerge across the sample. 
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XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 
 
Table 4. Perception of the main cyber and information risks in the supply chain 
 
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 
 
 
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 
 
Table 5. Main sources of information and cyber risks in the supply chain 
 
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 
 
 
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 
 
Table 6. SCRM and CSCRM at the case companies 
 
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 
 
 
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 
 
Table 7. Security safeguards and initiatives  
 
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 
 
Within Case Analysis 
Company A 
Company A shows a low perception of the probability of occurrence of the main cyber and 
information risks. Data breach and disclosure is the only one with a medium score, given the large 
amount of relationships with supply chain partners that, according to our interviewee, can increase the 
likelihood of leakage of data. While this is acknowledged for all stages of the supply chain, our 
interviewee pointed out that for Company A this seems to be more critical on the supply side, where 
they have several worldwide suppliers connected in a network of different layers that go beyond Tier 
1. Sharing information on product and process design is mandatory for ensuring good product quality 
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but on the other hand can be critical. In fact, this company generally perceives as high or medium the 
potential impact on business of cyber and information risks. When risks actually disrupt the 
operational life of the company they produce business critical effects, able to put in jeopardy their 
competitive advantage. 
  
“The impact of cyber risks on our business can be problematic, because we base the majority of our 
operations on information on products and processes, which needs to be safeguarded.” (Company A) 
 
A recent example is represented by the disclosure of confidential information (a picture) on the design 
of a new variant of a top-selling product that was posted on social media by an employee and quickly 
became viral. Even though the intention of this employee was only to share “great news” with friends, 
this caused repercussions on the launch of the new product, on the promotional campaign and on the 
entire supply chain. A limited array of actions could be undertaken. To contain the negative effects of 
the leakage, some details on the product and its packaging were changed by working together with 
suppliers, a refreshed advertising campaign was produced and then shared with retailers in order to 
avoid disappointment with consumers. To make this possible, the company had to rely on the very 
strong relationships they have with key customers and suppliers to allow this changes. This shows 
how important a set of strong relationships with key partners is to ensure a quick reaction for a speedy 
recovery according to the principles of resilience. 
 
“When it (an industrial secret) is out there…it’s out there! You can’t do much at that point.” 
(Company A) 
 
Company A is introducing as a consequence of this event additional training for employees, through a 
programme that enables employees to identify sensitive assets throughout the supply chain in terms of 
intangible assets and intellectual property. It aims at providing supply chain simulation cases on the 
impact that non-compliant behaviours can have on the company’s competitive advantage and the 
management of relationships with suppliers and customers. The intention is to extend the scope of 
these simulations also beyond the traditional dyadic relationships to facilitate a better understanding 
among trainees of the supply chain implications at a network level. This would create the conditions 
for a more cyber resilient supply chain especially to prepare participants to potential disruptions and 
allow them to maintain a robust steady-state. 
Company A sees the main sources of risks (both malicious and non-intentional) laying internally to 
their business and from their supply chain partners. The level of protection is perceived as even lower 
when the whole supply network is concerned, especially with relationships beyond Tier 1. In fact, 
they feel it would be more difficult to become aware of disruptions when they have no direct visibility 
on the processes, procedures and security initiatives in the distant stages of the supply chain. They do 
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work with contractors in order to share security policies and they ask contractors to comply with them. 
Additionally, they sign collaborative agreements for sharing information on security incidents and 
continuity plans and they conduct audits on supply chain partners’ security (asking the partner to 
provide evidence of the adopted security procedures, especially when data storage and sharing are 
concerned). But all of this happens upstream only and not beyond Tier 1. Still, they don’t feel they 
have full “control” or visibility on what really happens beyond that stage. 
To confront the risks, Company A has a proactive approach to SCRM, and the responsibility for this 
process is given to the various business units. This approach is translated into practice through the 
deployment of periodic risk assessments at business unit level, which concurrently take into account 
the downstream and upstream supply chain. They produce enough information to generate specific 
scenario analyses, with particular emphasis on the potential impact of the detected sources of risks. 
The ownership to the business unit level allows for a more agile response to local problems. There is a 
shared ownership of the SCRM process: the operations department along with the market operations. 
This solution allows for a global coverage of the risks, encompassing the supply, the manufacturing 
and distribution sides. As far as the ownership of the CSCRM process is concerned, Company A 
declares an involvement of IT, operations and market operations. The interaction between IT and 
operations can be “bottom-up” when operations proactively trigger the development of specific 
procedures or initiatives for addressing local needs, as for the case of a project for sharing master data 
with one key supplier, which required the activation of a dedicated protocol for data transmission and 
storage; it can be “top-down” when IT develops organization-wide solutions to respond to top 
management’s requests. 
 
“It should be a shared development process among departments: we, from operations/supply chain, 
know what it should be done and what we need for making the supply chain work upstream and 
downstream. We know that IT know how it should be done, they know how to guide and translate our 
requirements, pointing out technical details that we’re not able to see.” (Company A) 
 
Consistently with their perception of high impact on business of cyber and information risks and their 
proactive approach to risk management, Company A adopts a comprehensive range of initiatives. 
However, a lower level of adoption of organizational initiatives emerges from our data. While the 
general information security principles are included in the corporate strategy to align with the 
business needs and shared across departments, our interviewee declares that no visibility of plans for 
investments or improvement initiatives on cyber and information security is present, since this 
appears to be an IT domain. The other organizational initiatives seem not to be essential since top 
management (responsible for those decisions) probably feel that the current wide spanning approach 
and adoption of initiatives are already fit for purpose and meet their security needs.  
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Company B 
Company B shows a low-medium perception of both probability of occurrence and impact on 
business coming from cyber and information risks, as it is felt that the real criticality lies in keeping 
customers’ records uncorrupted and secure. They especially perceive this, since they are a logistics 
service provider. They handle data related to customers’ activities for carrying out their logistics 
operations, and consequently they need customers to trust their ability to handle and store data in a 
secure way. 
Company B believes that the same sources of cyber and information risks can be both malicious and 
non-intentional. They point out that almost all players in the supply chain can represent a source of 
risk, since sharing of data is essential for doing business in the supply chain. Customers are seen 
external to this process, while suppliers and contractors can be problematic when subcontractors and 
the network of suppliers beyond Tier 1 are concerned. However, according to the interviewee it is 
necessary to find a compromise that allows companies to run their activities smoothly. 
 
“People along the supply chain handling data can be a risk, but you cannot become too paranoid 
otherwise you cannot do business” (Company B) 
 
This compromise is achieved through a reactive approach to CSCRM, led by IT and finance 
departments, which is implemented by means of contingency planning. Supported by the headquarters 
(providing guidelines/general policies), the business units are empowered to operationalize the plans 
when it is required by adverse situations, with the aim to adaptably contain and reduce their impact on 
business, even though these actions are mainly internal to the company. 
 
“We had a data leakage problem a few years ago, when one of our former employees joined a 
competitor and downloaded our customers’ data on his laptop before leaving. While checking his 
laptop our IT guy detected this massive download. As a security policy, we deactivated data storage 
on USB sticks and other external devices so we knew that data shouldn’t have gone far away. To 
contain this problem we formatted his laptop and erased all attachments in his e-mail account. 
Apparently it worked as no effects were detected.” (Company B) 
 
As a lesson learned from this incident, Company B reinforced restricted user access within the 
organization, and in case of subcontractors, they also restricted download and print of data, allowing 
read-only functionalities. In this case it was the incident to trigger the adoption of security initiatives. 
However, our interviewee pointed out that in the majority of the cases, customers are the ones driving 
their privacy and security policies, by setting the principles for storing and using their data. 
Consistently with the reactive approach to CSCRM, Company B seems to focus primarily on event 
management initiatives and on IT security tools. This shows an approach to resilience that focuses 
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only on the “respond” principle, and still a multi-stage concept is not applied in their practices. 
However, this company recognizes the need for further developments in the area of training, internal 
awareness and external collaboration with additional initiatives of people management and mentoring 
and additional collaborative initiatives with subcontractors and customers. This could be facilitated if 
a clearer relationship between the investment in this sort of initiatives and the related benefits (both 
tangible and intangible) existed. 
 
“It’s a problem of resources and mind-set along the supply chain. You want to work collaboratively 
with everyone upstream and downstream, but you want to see the results of your efforts” (Company B) 
 
Company C 
Company C presents a profile where probability of occurrence and impact on business are both seen 
as relevant. This company seems to be aware of the dangers coming from all sort of risks, while they 
put a special emphasis on the probability of occurrence of those risks related to the theft of intellectual 
property, crash of their website and failure of the IT network. This seems to be due to the incidents 
they recently had, which made them aware of the unpredictability of cyber risks and the consequent 
effects. 
 
“We operate in a tough environment and any disruption can be fatal. It’s also a hostile environment, 
where attacks can come when (and from whom) you don’t expect. We recently experienced an 
incident causing the unavailability of service of our system for three working days. This had severe 
repercussions on our business, and we fought to get back to normality. A very good lesson learned, 
we won’t let it happen again!” (Company C) 
 
The attack implied the loss of the website and the capability to send/receive e-mails. The domain 
registry was hacked, the system settings changed and the access security records deleted. As a 
consequence, the company was unable to send or receive any sort of communication/data from/to 
suppliers and customers. All planning and execution activities, including live tracking of shipments 
and invoicing, were blocked. Investigations were carried out and it was discovered that the attack 
came from an insider. It took three days to restore the system with its functionalities in a multi-site 
environment, which involved coordination of IT recovery operations across sites. Continuity plans in 
terms of emergency (telephone) communications were put in place with customers and main 
subcontractors so that the already planned deliveries could be completed and that urgent orders could 
be manually managed. A concern raised by our interviewee regarded the fact that they’re not 
completely sure of the presence of similar instruments adopted by other supply chain players, in case 
of adverse situations. 
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Customers and subcontractors are seen as relevant sources of cyber risk by Company C, especially in 
terms of lack of control on how data is managed and used and how collaborative procedures for 
managing passwords and security access information are managed. Competitors and cyber terrorists 
are perceived as potential disrupting elements, which can lead to malicious attacks. They see a variety 
of non-intentional sources, such as power outages and technical problems, as potential internal issues. 
Company C stressed the relevance of adopting mixed proactive and reactive approaches to SCRM. 
The aim is to generate the big picture and be prepared to unforeseen events, to be responsive in case 
of immediate calls for action and at the same time to be able to maintain a steady-state according to 
the principles of resilience. This approach is reflected in the level of centralization of the SCRM 
process, which combines the leading support of the headquarters with local planning and execution 
responsibilities to business units. Coherently, a range of tools is adopted, including business 
continuity plan, scenario analysis and decision trees. Owing to the overall approach, the SCRM and 
the CSCRM ownership is shared among various departments. The human resources department is also 
involved in driving the key role that the “human factor” can play during adversities and to retain 
oversight of social media and communications with partners in the supply chain. This kind of solution 
is also aimed, according to the company, at trying to overcome the communication limits across the 
chain of supply and go beyond Tier 1 to manage crises by means of social media and their vast reach. 
Coherently with their perception of the main cyber and information risks Company C adopts a wide 
range of initiatives, ranging from organizational actions to IT security tools and operational resilience. 
From a supply chain point of view, they adopt initiatives spanning from upstream to downstream. 
They require their subcontractors to comply with their security policies in terms of data management, 
privacy and disclosure restrictions. Even if they do not conduct security audits on subcontractors, they 
rely on ISO 27000 certified companies only. Downstream they have to comply with the security 
policies of their customers; even though the compliance process is mainly customer driven, they have 
a proactive approach to this, which implies that they promote their solutions to customers as 
facilitators of integration, through collaborative agreements based on secure data sharing via 
developed/customised interfaces. From the event management perspective, Company C has 
communication procedures in place along the supply chain. In particular, incident logs are produced 
and shared with partners where appropriate: these include risk registers, details on operations, 
implemented recovery actions (from a managerial and IT perspective) and achieved results. Again, 
concerns were raised about the presence of similar approaches in the extended chain of supply. 
 
 
Company D 
Company D shows a medium-low perception of both probability of occurrence and impact on 
business of risks. However, they have a higher perception of probability and impact of risks related to 
the IT system since they rely on a massive amount of data for their international shipping operations 
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managed through the system. The same was not said about their website, as it was admitted that they 
probably don’t use the website enough for commerce but mainly for providing information. It would 
be expected to move more activities with customers through a web portal in the future, and risk would 
certainly rise. 
Company D recognizes the relevance of non-intentional risks, and points out that these sources of risk 
can be difficult to be protected against. According to our interviewee, current employees can be 
trusted against malicious attacks, but it was pointed out that unintentional situations have occurred. 
 
“We trust our people but we had unintentional cases where e-mails went out to the wrong person 
disclosing sensitive information, or when someone turned the firewall off to speed activities up.” 
(Company D) 
 
Being a shipping company, they feel exposed to sources of risk coming from foreign nation states, 
intelligence services and hackers/hacktivists. This is especially critical, according to our interviewee, 
when they have to exchange information at ports with port operators, which are perceived as 
vulnerable to cyber-attacks. In many cases around the world their communication channels are 
outdated or relying heavily on unencrypted satellite communications. This creates situations where 
port operations can be hacked and blocked with repercussions on the service level provided by the 
company. Company D says they are always proactive, and devolve the process to the local level to 
deal with location specific issues.  
 
“We tend to react by building our actions on the specific needs of the situation and of the location 
where we’re operating: we need to be flexible in the way we respond when things go wrong, 
otherwise we struggle to recover.” (Company D) 
 
The plans are shared throughout the firm for best practice and reviewed semi-annually by top 
management. There are no specific tools that the firm employs, as each case is reviewed on a case by 
case-by-case basis. In Company D the logistics/operations group is highly involved in the SCRM 
process. The finance department is also involved, but mainly focuses on issues relating to currency 
fluctuations. Top management and IT are the only departments involved with CSCRM.  
Company D shows a focus on IT security tools, IT operational resilience and event management, 
while it lacks of engagement internally with organizational initiatives, training and awareness, and 
data management. Hence, it seems that this company only partially complies with the principles of a 
multi-stage approach to resilience. 
However, they subscribed to an insurance policy for their data, and declared that this is connected to 
the nature of their business rather than coming as a request by supply chain partners. Company D 
27 
 
thinks that most employees are cyber-aware, but acknowledges the relevance of non-intentional 
behaviours that need to be addressed through appropriate training programmes.  
 
“An errant click on an e-mail attachment could introduce a virus and damage the system. 
Participating in this study has prompted a rethink on providing an awareness training programme, 
even if informal, with e-mail notices of cyber issues.” (Company D) 
 
Externally, Company D recognizes the need for improving the level of compliance and awareness 
along the chain of supply, but this requires also an effort from supply chain partners. On one side, 
they require their customers and subcontractors to comply with their security policies in terms of data 
and communication encryption. While larger customers are usually aligned with these requirements, 
smaller customers and subcontractors tend to be more problematic in this regard, and they tend to lose 
control and visibility on their actions and initiatives. In those cases Company D includes 
communication protocols to reduce the risks of uncontrolled flows. On the other side, given the 
vulnerability of ports, they have introduced some intelligence for mapping the more vulnerable ports. 
If possible they tend to avoid them (usually smaller ports). Larger ports are perceived as more secure 
but relying only on those ports can have effects on the optimization of the shipping operations, with 
repercussions on costs and service level. They wish they could establish collaborative agreements 
with customers (especially) to allow an allocation of flows that encompasses concurrent 
considerations on cost and service but also risk to build a more resilient allocation of the flows. 
According to our interviewee, better visibility on the return of investments related to the 
implementation of such initiatives would facilitate their adoption. 
 
“Securing the supply chain is a two-way street with both customers and suppliers checking/auditing 
each other. It takes time and effort to achieve something, all the parties involved need to see the 
benefits.” (Company D) 
 
Company E 
Company E generally regards probability of occurrence as low, while it seems to view the impact on 
business of cyber and information risks as critical for some risks only. In particular, crash of website 
and failure of company’s IT network are perceived as the most crucial ones, as you might expect for 
an online retailer, with the website and IT systems being the “lifeblood” of the company. They also 
pointed out that although the probability of the website crashing was low, this was due to the large 
team in place to make sure this event does not happen, or if it does, they can react and recover as 
quickly as possible. 
 
28 
 
“We work on-line. It is vital for us to have our e-commerce platform always working securely. For 
this reason we have a dedicated team to keep the website secure, or to rectify problems in minutes if 
and when they arise.” (Company E) 
 
They also point out that according to their perspective within the supply chain, maintaining secure 
customer records is critical due to the trust customers (final consumers for them) put in the company 
when they buy online. Company E recognises that consumers are very aware of cyber risk and 
identity theft. Although data is encrypted and thus the probability of occurrence is seen as low, there 
is a perceived risk that must be dealt with, especially in terms of impact on the reputation and 
credibility of their whole supply chain. Company E notes that their website/IT system is constantly 
being attacked/probed, and these attacks are recorded in appropriate logs, but it hasn’t brought the site 
down yet. The impression is that these intentional attacks are on the rise. There has been the 
occasional technical outage, but any have been of short duration. Again, they point out that there is a 
dedicated security team (including IT) to deal with these threats. 
To confront these challenges, Company E has tried to put in a proactive SCRM system in the 
beginning, in an attempt to adopt a multi-stage approach to resilience. However, the company now 
states to being reactive to new threats mainly through ad-hoc interventions for containing the impact 
of disruptions (e.g. looking for alternative suppliers or service providers when the main ones are not 
available), focusing mainly on the “respond” and “recover” phases of supply chain resilience. 
Decisions are taken centrally at the headquarters level, and the ownership of the SCRM process is 
shared between top management and operations/logistics. Specific tools for SCRM are not adopted as 
the involved departments feel they are under resourced.  
 
“We would like to use more tools and approaches for managing supply chain risk, especially mapping 
tools, but we would need more resources for developing and implementing these tools. If we had those 
tools in place we could be more aware of the potential threats and be proactive in managing 
unexpected event, instead we’re just firefighting bad events.” (Company E) 
 
As far as the ownership of the CSCRM process is concerned, various departments are involved, 
including IT, finance and purchasing, while the supply chain director is accountable. Coherently with 
the adopted reactive approach and their perception of the criticality of their e-commerce platform, 
Company E adopts a wide range of initiatives, mainly focusing on IT operational initiatives, IT 
security tools, data management and event management. It is interesting to underline that Company E 
is the only one in our sample employing the role of CISO in their organization. Again, this may be 
connected to the above considerations related to their focus and activities, and it could represent a 
basis for developing a more pervasive approach to cyber resilience that could overcome the 
limitations above mentioned. In fact, currently other organizational initiatives, training and internal 
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awareness are less adopted. From a supply chain perspective, Company E declared that downstream, 
since they’re directly consumer facing, they don’t have in place traditional tools to require customers 
to comply with their policies. However, they offer security solutions to consumers (e.g. requirements 
on the strength of the password when customers open an account, secure payment channels, 
encryption of data). Upstream, they require suppliers and contractors to comply with their privacy and 
security policies, but they do not undertake any collaborative initiative with them. Our interviewee 
explained that the large number of upstream players in their supply chain adds to the complexity of 
implementing such initiatives. This hinders the adoption and promotion of collaborations along their 
supply chain towards enhanced supply chain resilience in the cyber space. They claim that this is even 
more critical when relationships that go beyond the dyad of Tier 1 are concerned. As a consequence 
they leverage the internal IT security side to deal with and resolve potential issues. 
 
Cross Case Analysis 
Cyber and information risks in the supply chain 
By concurrently analysing the whole sample, data show that the probability of occurrence of the main 
risks is perceived as lower than the impact on business. It appears that companies are more worried 
about the effects of incidents than the chance of incidents happening, even if literature reports that 
incidents are growing in frequency (Gaudenzi and Siciliano, 2017).  
This seems especially true for those risks such as customer records compromised and the failure of 
companies’ IT network. These are perceived as the most disruptive ones by the sample companies, 
and with the latter being also generally perceived with a high level of probability of occurrence. It 
seems that the perception of cyber and information risks is mainly related to the IT infrastructure side, 
consistently with the involvement of IT in all companies. From a supply chain perspective, the 
concerns regarding customers’ records compromised could be due to the impact on reputation and 
competitive advantage that a cyber-attack could have downstream in the supply chain, especially 
given the negative effects that could jeopardize the relationships with customers.  
It could be expected to see a similar attitude also with respect to the upstream stages of the supply 
chain. However our sample companies are less concerned about risky events that could affect 
suppliers’ records. By looking at the nature of the companies, Company A (manufacturer) and 
Company E (retailer) show high perceptions of the impacts of cyber and information risks on their 
business, while Company B and Company D (logistics service providers) have a low/medium 
perception of both the probability of occurrence and the impacts. Company C (logistics service 
provider) shows a higher level of perception of risks in general, and this could be linked to the fact 
that they’ve been recent victims of attacks.  
We propose that that the exposure to incidents affects the level of perception of risks, raising the level 
of awareness compared to other players, especially as far as the effects of incidents are concerned. 
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This is something suggested by the literature (Järveläinen, 2013), but reinforced by our findings that 
present an original view by means of novel data gathered during our case studies. 
 
Main sources of cyber and information risks 
From an overall perspective, all companies clearly identify the presence of the so-called “enemy 
within”. Employees (current and former) are seen as a main source of cyber and information risks, 
due to both malicious and non-intentional actions. It is interesting to notice that according to our 
interviewees, also non-malicious behaviours by employees are a considerable source of cyber and 
information risks. This seems to be a common feeling across the sample, probably given the difficulty 
in controlling risks connected to these sources when they inadvertently put their companies at risk. 
Our work enriches the current body of knowledge by presenting these findings that find confirmation 
in the literature, as highlighted also by Happ et al. (2016): we offer insights that clearly show how in 
several occasions employees do not even realize they have been manipulated and or that they have 
inadvertently disclosed sensitive information, so it seems they’re not “prepared” according to the 
principles of supply chain resilience. This lack of “preparedness” could also mean that companies are 
not completely aligned with an evolutionary resilience approach, given that they seem to struggle in 
having an adaptive capacity to the changing situations in their own workforce.  
We propose that, even if a source of cyber and information risk lies internally to the focal company, 
the effects of risky events generated by this source cannot be contained within the boundaries of the 
company itself and spread across the whole chain of supply, both upstream and downstream. These 
events represent actual “black swans”, which are challenging to recover from when they occur 
(Gaudenzi and Siciliano, 2017), as the examples of Company A and Company C demonstrate. 
 
A commonality emerging from our analysis that adds to the current body of knowledge on cyber and 
information risks lies again in the supply chain perspective. In fact, across the sample there is a 
consensus on the criticality of those sources of risks that lie in the upstream stages of the supply chain, 
especially when suppliers or contractors beyond the Tier 1 are concerned. One of the main literature-
acknowledged barriers to enhanced supply chain resilience (i.e. lack of visibility – Ali et al., 2017) 
emerges from our cases.  
Building on our findings, we propose that especially when subcontractors and the other players in the 
distant stages of the supply chain are concerned, lack of visibility and control makes these supply 
chain players to be perceived as a major source of cyber risk (both malicious and non-intentional 
actions). These sources can be represented also by critical infrastructural nodes (e.g. ports) and 
organizations handling data there (e.g. port operators), as shown by the case of Company D and their 
concerns on ports/port operators and the related cascading effects due to cyber disruptions. 
Companies feel particularly exposed to risks coming from these distant sources, especially because 
they feel that their Tier 1 partners are not always able to have full control, as pointed out by Company 
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B. Concerns regard also how risk propagates and migrates upstream and downstream in the supply 
chain, as a consequence of lack of visibility, coordination and control in the extended supply chain. 
This constitutes interesting evidence, which goes beyond the insights proposed by the literature in the 
works by Han and Shin (2016) and Tukamuhabwa et al. (2017). Our work offers a more holistic view 
on the end-to-end interactions among supply chain actors and on the mechanisms driving these 
relationships. From a practical view, our findings also stimulate companies in supply chains to extend 
their traditional arm’s-length transactions towards more coordinated approaches to supply chain 
resilience at a network level, with the aim to overcome the mentioned barriers preventing companies 
from achieving enhanced resilience (Ali et al., 2017).  
 
Approaches to SCRM and CSCRM 
From an overall perspective, from the performed interviews it appears that companies are aware of the 
growing importance of cyber and information risks in the supply chain. They also acknowledge the 
significance of adopting a structured holistic approach to manage them, offering a novel view from 
the field that shows an interesting alignment with the literature (Bartol, 2014; Soomro et al., 2016).  
Notwithstanding this unanimous recognition, our cross case analysis shows that a consistent approach 
to SCRM is not adopted across the sample companies, and a mixture of reactive and proactive 
approaches can be detected. This is tightly connected with the approach to the concept of supply chain 
resilience adopted by companies. From a combined view of the findings, it appears that only a few 
companies have a focus that embraces all the phases of resilience discussed in the literature, while 
others tend to concentrate more on the “respond” and “recover” phases (Ribeiro and Barbosa-Povoa, 
2018). This focus on the “respond” and “recover” phases seems to suggest again that companies 
haven’t developed that long-term adaptive capacity (Davoudi, 2012) yet, so they are not able to be 
“prepared”, to “maintain” and to adapt to the continuous changes and inner tensions of a turbulent 
environment such as the one studied in this research. In this sense, our work presents an interesting 
contribution to theory and practice, since it offers insights on the level of development of this adaptive 
capacity by companies, when it comes to cyber and information risk management, while the literature 
is lacking of discussion on this area. 
It seems that more uniformity is present with reference to the level of centralization, with the 
headquarters supporting business units for facing local needs in the majority of the cases. In terms of 
ownership, it is interesting to notice that consistently with the level of centralization above, there is a 
considerable involvement of top management in the ownership of the SCRM process (mainly for 
sponsoring and reviewing purposes). We note also a widespread involvement of operations, supply 
chain and logistics in terms also of accountability. However, this level of involvement of the supply 
chain-related functions is not reflected in the ownership of the CSCRM process. The IT department is 
involved in the CSCRM process within all the investigated companies. On the contrary, only in 
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Companies A and Company E supply chain related departments have a relatively active role in the 
concerned matter, with the supply chain director involved at Company E.  
This partially confirms the existing literature, which reports the commitment of IT (e.g. BCI, 2016), 
but also extends it by showing that currently some companies are moving towards a more holistic 
approach to CSCRM in their organizational structure, allowing for a richer set of supply chain-related 
details that inform the CSCRM strategy (Soomro et al., 2016). A good example of how this can be 
achieved is represented by Company A and their mixture of “bottom-up” and “top-down” approaches 
in the development of IT initiatives for managing risks along the chain of supply: this allows the 
supply chain world to feed relevant information on their security needs into the technical world of IT.  
However, the supply chain department is not fully involved yet in the decision making process 
concerning investments to CSCRM. As a consequence from our cases it seems that the majority of 
investments mainly regards the IT domain. It also emerges from our case companies that the adopted 
approaches do not envisage any involvement of customers and/or suppliers in the design and 
implementation of initiatives. So they tend to be rather limited in the scope of the involvement of 
parties external even to the focal company. According to the literature this “isolation” in the approach 
to the decision-making process could potentially prevent companies from achieving resilience 
(Ribeiro and Barbosa-Povoa, 2018). Through our investigation, we also found that this isolation also 
prevents companies from being prepared to change and from being able to continuously adapt to the 
tensions present in the overall supply chain beyond the dyad, and this constitutes an important 
extension to the current theory and practice. 
Hence, it appears that the management of cyber and information risks (within companies and along 
the supply chain) is mainly seen as a domain of the IT department. Building on the collected evidence, 
it emerges that decision making is led by IT and in isolation from supply chain partners: hence, we 
propose that this leads to ignore supply chain dynamics and ultimately it negatively affects supply 
chain resilience. 
 
Companies’ initiatives to manage cyber and information risk in supply chains 
By concurrently looking at the adoption of initiatives as reported in Table 6 as a whole, it immediately 
appears that event management initiatives are fully adopted across the whole sample. This indicates 
that all companies have in place procedures and processes to manage the consequences arising from a 
risky event. This seems to be in line with the literature (BCI, 2016), which reports that a large number 
of organizations have business continuity arrangements in place to deal with cyber and information 
risks and responds to the principle of situational awareness (Herrera and Janczewski, 2015).  
However, our evidence suggests that companies are not sure about “how far” these initiatives can go 
and reach the network especially beyond the dyad. They also question if these initiatives are bi-
directional through joint relationship efforts (Scholten and Schilder, 2015), or only pushed by the 
proposers without any guarantee on the reciprocity of the approach (as highlighted by Company C). 
33 
 
This seems also to suggest that companies have developed an approach to supply chain resilience able 
to cover the “respond” and “recover” phases only (Ribeiro and Barbosa-Povoa, 2018), but not to 
develop a long-term adaptive capacity to address not only disturbances but also continuous changes. 
Categories such as data management (especially in terms of control measures on user access), IT 
security tools and IT operational resilience show a higher degree of adoption across the sample, 
compared to categories such as organizational initiatives, training and internal awareness, and 
compliance and external awareness.  
This suggests that the majority of CSCRM initiatives seem related to the IT domain. It also suggests 
that organizations seem very much focused on “firewalling themselves”, rather than leveraging a 
wider range of initiatives to extend the protection from cyber and information risks to the supply 
chain beyond the focal company and the dyad. While this is confirmed by Linton et al. (2014), our 
findings also confirm that there is lack of a holistic approach to the subject matter, as indicated by 
Soomro et al. (2016), and provide a picture that clearly shows the boundaries of companies’ actions, 
extending what it is available in the literature today. 
This is also reflected by the details of the adopted organizational initiatives. The sample companies 
haven’t yet introduced the adoption of the “chief information security officer” (CISO) as a formalized 
professional role, apart from Company E, which pointed out that this is something related to the 
strong focus of the company on the e-commerce world. The other interviewees pointed out that a step-
change towards a more holistic, pervasive and wide-spanning approach to CSCRM could occur with 
the presence of a CISO, with better integration and involvement of the different organizational units. 
Internally, it is felt that the operations/supply chain departments could have a greater involvement in 
the CSCRM process. According to the interviewees, these departments are not necessarily supposed 
to lead the CSCRM process, while the CISO should be the “champion”, i.e. the most suitable 
professional taking a coordinating role between the IT department and all the other business functions. 
The involvement of the operations/supply chain departments is essential in the definition of the 
requirements of appropriate IT systems and identification of the criticalities when sharing and 
managing data in the cyber space with supply chain partners. Externally, this would allow facilitating 
the involvement or communication with suppliers and customers, and providing an understanding of 
the supply chain dynamics to promote the CSCRM initiatives beyond the boundaries of the focal 
company stretching also beyond the dyad. This could also enable the development of a long-term 
adaptive capability according to an evolutionary resilience view. Hence, our work offers an important 
extension to the existing knowledge and to the current practice, by offering a novel view on the role of 
the CISO and the architecture of the relationships in the supply chain with reference to the 
management of cyber and information risk according to a more holistic approach. 
The discussed points would have positive implications also from the perspective of external 
awareness initiatives. From the collected evidence, it appears that companies are able to manage 
external awareness initiatives up to a certain point, which in the majority of the cases is represented 
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by the first tier, i.e. dyadic level. Companies can generally achieve a certain degree of alignment 
(Pradabwong et al., 2017), by requiring suppliers and customers to comply with their security policies. 
In some cases they conduct security audits on supply chain partners and devise collaborative 
agreements/arrangements with supply chain partners for security (see for example Company C).  
However, as mentioned above, they all declare to be unable to extend the concept of alignment 
beyond their direct contacts, in other words beyond the dyad. This confirms that an extended holistic 
approach is still something missing also with reference to this category of initiatives. It seems that all 
the case companies invest on securing the supply chain both upstream and downstream, with the latter 
often driven by customers as shown in the case of Company B. But when they are the ones driving the 
implementation of formal compliance audits along the supply chain, besides facing challenges in 
going beyond the dyad, it appears that they tend to struggle in operationalizing the idea of compliance. 
They also seem to be hampered by the trade-off between security and performance of 
communications and execution of activities at supply chain level, as declared by Company B. Hence, 
we propose that the presence of the CISO working closely with the supply chain department could 
facilitate a more holistic view of the whole CSCRM process, allowing for: moving away from the “IT 
domination”; overcoming decisions taken and initiatives implemented in isolation within the focal 
companies; developing a long-term adaptive capacity; and ultimately leading to better cyber resilience 
in the supply chain beyond the dyad. 
 
Better supply chain resilience can also be achieved through supply chain coordination (Ali et al., 
2017), which in turn can be built on synchronization and shared and mutually-created knowledge 
(Herrera and Janczewsky, 2015; Scholten and Schilder, 2015). These factors are not completely 
reflected in the set of adopted initiatives by the sample companies. If, on one hand, sharing 
information and data to create that shared knowledge is recognized to improve supply chain efficiency 
and effectiveness (Kembro and Selviaridis, 2015), on the other hand collaborative 
agreements/arrangements with supply chain partners are essential for companies to be reassured that 
data and information sharing will not negatively impact their level of security and privacy, as stressed 
by the literature (Barkataki and Zeineddine, 2015). On the contrary, it could also prove to be a tool for 
strengthening the level of protection and trust as leverage for better managing incidents and allowing 
for better resilience (Ali et al., 2017). Such an approach should extend beyond the supply chain to 
embrace the whole supply chain network beyond Tier 1, including subcontractors, suppliers, and also 
customers.  
However, from our analysis this seems to be very far from being a reality, and this constitutes 
evidence not present in the current body of knowledge. It also appears to be a common pattern among 
the sample companies, regardless the stage of the supply chain in which they operate. The sample 
companies (see for example Company E) highlighted that this could be linked to the level of 
complexity of their connections with suppliers, especially when the tiers beyond the dyad are 
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concerned. Consequently they prefer to protect what they directly “see” instead of trying to manage 
the complexity of their connections upstream, through methods and tools for reducing this complexity 
and prioritizing the most critical links. The “natural” loss of control and visibility of data and 
information as you move further up or down the supply chain should be compensated by the 
trustworthiness (Windelberg, 2016) of appropriate secured data sharing systems and collaborative 
processes (Barkataki and Zeineddine, 2015). Hence, we propose that conformance to standards, 
certifications and collaborative practices for a more coordinated approach at the network level could 
also facilitate more information sharing across the supply chain at network level, assisting in the 
exploitation of the value of information for better resilience. 
 
Another piece of evidence emerging from our cross-case analysis is the necessity to introduce training 
programmes for employees, to educate them in the correct use of the available technology, tools and 
systems (cyber hygiene). Given the raising concerns about the “enemy within”, companies seem to be 
considering the implementation of appropriate internal security awareness training programmes for 
employees.  
However, as it emerged in the case of Company A, training shouldn’t be only focused on an internal 
development of people, but should empower employees to appreciate the impact of their behaviour 
and actions on the entire supply chain (e.g. by delivering training programmes and simulations able to 
tackle these challenges and to help employees in breaking the boundaries of their workplace). Hence, 
we propose that this kind of initiatives should be shared with supply chain partners to allow for a 
more “educated” supply chain overall, which would lead to a supply chain better “prepared” and able 
to “respond” and to continuously adapt, according to the evolutionary resilience view.  
In fact, people need to be educated to avoid cyber security non-compliant behaviours, usually more 
convenient, less time consuming and perceived as more productive in terms of performance and speed 
of business. A common non-compliant behaviour is to look for better network performance by 
disabling protection tools (e.g. antivirus, firewall), which generated a debate in the literature on the 
trade-off between network security and performance (Intel Security, 2014). In line with the literature 
(Windelberg, 2016), these cyber security non-compliant behaviours are also connected to deliberate 
choices based on implicit trust assumptions, which lead to underestimating the consequences of 
actions internally but even more importantly on the supply chain, and to be “unaware victims” of 
social engineering attacks. 
  
Finally, in the selection and implementation of appropriate initiatives, it emerged from our sample 
companies that it is important to identify a good fit between investments in these initiatives and the 
level of cyber risks in the supply chain. As suggested by the literature, this fit, which is defined as 
balanced resilience, is affected by the nature of the business and its supply chain (see for example the 
case of Companies D, which adopted a data insurance product given the nature of their business). 
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From our interviews it also emerges that this balance should be explicitly shared with supply chain 
partners. In this sense, in a connected supply chain the concept of balanced resilience should evolve in 
the concept of cyber supply chain balanced resilience, which represents another novel element 
emerging from our original work. This can be expressed as the focused application of the mentioned 
“right fit” between level of risk and investments in SCRM process to the cyber space that connects the 
supply chain players at a network level. From our study, it emerges that at the moment companies 
tend to work on the balanced resilience at a firm level, extending in some case at a dyadic level with 
Tier 1 partners. Hence, we propose that the extension of the balanced resilience concept to embrace 
the supply chain network would lead to improved CSCRM, and in this sense we extend the current 
knowledge through the proposal of the new concept of cyber supply chain balanced resilience. 
Literature recognizes the value of extending this concept to the network level (Hanf and Dautzenberg, 
2006; Pradabwong et al., 2017). 
 
Conclusions 
In this research we addressed the management of cyber and information risks in todays connected 
supply chains, through multiple case studies, with the aim to push the boundaries of supply chain 
research and practice. This allowed extending and developing the theory on the subject area as a 
combination of SCRM and resilience, and information risk management. In doing this we also filled 
the identified gap in the literature, which lacks of contributions that address CSCRM from a supply 
chain and not solely from a technical perspective, and we extended supply chain knowledge beyond a 
dyadic perspective. 
Our study in fact furthers our understanding of the subject matter, laying the first foundations to shed 
light on the studied phenomena and it stimulates further research on the topic. Also, our investigation 
provides the scientific and industrial communities with empirical data on this under explored matter, 
embracing the challenges posed by rapidly changing technologies that directly affect supply chain 
management. This investigation provides both theoretical and practical implications.  
 
Theoretical implications 
To begin with, this study contributes to theory by extending the current theory on the field through a 
combination of the theories on SCRM and resilience and information risk management. It adds to the 
SCRM and resilience theory since it is specifically focused on one of the main risks (i.e. cyber and 
information risk) that are now very high in the agenda of companies (Trombley, 2015), and that have 
been recognized but overlooked by the literature (Rajagopal et al., 2017). It adds to the information 
risk management theory since it addresses the complex issue of cyber and information risk in 
massively connected environments through a holistic approach including technology, people and 
processes at an extended supply chain level that goes beyond the dyad. As a result, researchers can 
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now appreciate the uniqueness of CSCRM compared to the traditional approach to information risk 
management. 
Second, this is one of the first studies focusing on the concept of supply chain resilience connected to 
cyber and information risk management, which is something missing in the existing theory on supply 
chain resilience. Building on the definition of supply chain resilience and related theory, this study has 
investigated how the concept of resilience and its phases are deployed in the CSCRM process. Our 
empirical results show that the advocated multi-stage approach to resilience including the phases of 
“prepare, respond, recover and maintain”, leading to a long-term capacity to adapt to continuous 
changes and inner tensions of today’s complex systems, is far from being pervasively adopted. 
Companies in fact, appear to be focused mainly on the “respond” and “recover” phases. It also 
emerged that resilience driven actions and related CSCRM initiatives have been implemented by 
companies in isolation, and consequently this seems to prevent organizations from achieving resilience 
at a supply chain level as far as cyber and information risks are concerned. 
Third, our study stresses the importance of understanding the role of people in the supply chain within 
the CSCRM process. Previous research has identified human resources as pivotal elements for 
advancing information management in companies and communities (Happ et al., 2016). However, as 
an extension to the existing theory on SCRM and information risk, our research showed that the 
impact of human behaviours can hardly be contained within the boundaries of the single organizations 
or dyadic relationships, but on the contrary can generate risky events that affect the supply chain at a 
network level. It also showed how difficult predicting or controlling the related risky events and 
consequences is when these propagate across the supply chain. This is especially true due to the 
complex and massively connected structure of modern global supply chains, which calls for an 
extended holistic approach leading to enhanced resilience.  
Fourth, our investigation extends the current theory on the subject by providing an overall view of the 
approach to the deployment of cyber security initiatives. Our results show that companies are mainly 
investing in IT initiatives, and that decisions regarding the investments on security initiatives are 
mainly in the hands of the IT department. Existing contributions focus primarily on the punctual 
implementation of clusters of actions and the underlying decision making process (e.g. Mukhopadhyay 
et al., 2013; Keegan, 2014; Kim and Im, 2014). From our research it emerges that a holistic approach 
to the deployment of initiatives is needed. A stronger involvement of the supply chain department in 
the decision making process (potentially with a CISO leading) is advocated to allow for a pervasive 
and network-spanning supply chain perspective in the CSCRM process. This could eventually lead to 
better supply chain resilience also through a better exploitation of the value of information.  
An unclear relationship between the required efforts and investments in initiatives and the 
tangible/intangible benefits coming from their implementation emerged too. This especially applies to 
those initiatives that go beyond the level of the pure IT solution, software or infrastructural 
intervention and reach some non-assessed areas such as people working in connected organizations. In 
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fact, previous contributions are focused on the study of the return on investment or on models for 
making economically rational information security investments (Yeo et al., 2014). This finding is 
linked to the relevance of a supply chain perspective, and confirms the need for ways in which real 
benefits should be isolated for enabling decision making. This should be done also by analysing the 
level of risk of the supply chain in order to identify the most suitable investment initiatives. This will 
allow companies to achieve cyber supply chain balanced resilience and to define appropriate cost-
benefit sharing mechanisms among the partners of the supply chain, when CSCRM initiatives are 
adopted in a collaborative way; something that currently is missing in the existing theory. 
Finally, existing literature has appreciated the complexity and the multi-faceted nature of cyber and 
information risks and the related sources of risks (Boyson, 2014), but no previous study has provided a 
rationalization of these items in order to make sense of this research subject. The present study adds to 
the existing theory by producing a classification of the main cyber and information risks and sources 
of risks, built through a literature review that adopts a supply chain perspective. According to this, the 
extent of cyber and information risks and related sources well beyond the boundaries of the focal 
company and dyadic relationships emerges, and researchers can use this classification as a reference 
framework for future investigations. The same applies to the suite of identified initiatives to managing 
cyber and information risks along the chain of supply. Previous research has mainly provided an 
overview of the various initiatives in a scattered way and from a technical perspective, and focus 
especially on the internal side of organizations (Linton et al., 2014; Soomro et al., 2016). By adopting 
a supply chain perspective, our work succeeds in proposing an exhaustive yet agile representation of 
the various initiatives that companies operating in connected supply chains potentially have at their 
disposal for addressing cyber and information risks, going beyond the boundaries of their 
organizations at a supply chain network level.  
 
Practical implications 
First, the imbalance towards the IT side of CSCRM emerged, while the discussed examples show the 
importance for companies to look at cyber and information risks also from a supply chain perspective 
given the negative effects of risky events that spread across the chain of supply. Concerns included 
lack of visibility and control beyond Tier 1 and how risk propagates in the various layers of the supply 
chain when it originates in distant stages. Hence, managers and employees should stretch their view 
outside the traditional boundaries of their “silo” activities. Rather than focussing on the technical 
aspect of CSCRM within the boundaries of the focal company, organizations need to adopt a holistic 
and extended approach to contemplate the sources of cyber and information risks. They also need to 
consider initiatives to cope with these risks by looking at the whole supply chain beyond the dyad and 
at the whole spectrum of factors involved (including people and their potential impact on the entire 
supply chain). The set of adopted initiatives should contemplate the four phases of the modern concept 
of resilience (i.e. prepare, respond, recover and maintain). They should also be bi-directional through 
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joint relationship efforts. It means that all partners involved in a critical link should be involved in the 
design and implementation of measures to manage cyber and information risks, in order to remove that 
isolation that prevents from developing a long-term adaptive capacity and achieving enhanced 
resilience. 
Critical links and most problematic “paths” from a cyber and information risk perspective in the 
supply chain could be identified through tools such as big data analytics, for example. These would 
allow managing the complexity of the massive connectivity of modern supply chains and allow 
decomposing the “overall picture” to target the main critical points first. This would permit companies 
to prioritize their initiatives to extend their CSCRM practices to partners beyond the Tier 1, and 
facilitate a bi-directional CSCRM process through joint relationship efforts.  
The adoption of security initiatives related to the IT technical infrastructure should be considered as a 
tool for leveraging the CSCRM process, and not the ultimate objective of the implementation of a risk 
management process. Companies should work on the concurrent adoption of a suitable and secure IT 
infrastructure combined with the development of collaborative and external awareness initiatives with 
partners to achieve better supply chain coordination. Through supply chain coordination mechanisms 
and secure communication tools, companies could leverage the value of information. Information 
sharing could be exploited as a tool to improve the shared knowledge and synchronization to support 
the CSCRM process and enhance companies’ resilience on all its four phases.  
As a further practical implication, managers are urged to invest in people to turn employees from 
sensitive targets or unaware disruptors to cyber-aware guardians of the cyber security of their supply 
chain. This should create awareness of the whole set of implications deriving from their actions that, as 
shown by the discussed examples, have severe and hardly controllable repercussions also on the 
activities of supply chain partners beyond the dyad. To this aim, the involvement of the human 
resources department seems to be a relevant factor, as showed by some of the investigated companies.  
Moreover, along the same lines, human resources departments could be seen as critical for exploiting 
their capability of controlling and leveraging the use of social media as tools for sharing and 
distributing information across the extended supply chain, making the most of the vast reach of these 
communication media. 
Further, for a successful decision making process, companies need to find an appropriate balance 
between required efforts and costs, and tangible/intangible benefits related to the adoption of the 
initiatives, according to the concept of balanced resilience as previously discussed. Our findings 
suggest that this relationship is still quite unclear and consequently as a fourth practical contribution 
our study invites organizations to explore the trade-off between efforts and benefits. In doing this, a 
holistic approach is necessary, and consequently the involvement of the supply chain department in the 
decision making process is crucial for embracing the vast range of implications that CSCRM 
initiatives can have. At the moment it appears that investment and decisions regarding this matter are 
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mainly an IT domain. This could be also a driver for implementing collaborative actions where all the 
partners involved have clarity on the cost-benefit sharing mechanisms and the related required efforts. 
As a final practical contribution, the present study provides a complete list of cyber and information 
risks, sources of risks in the supply chain and initiatives for CSCRM. Managers may be aware of the 
potential sources of risks and actions to take for increasing the level of cyber security in their supply 
chain. 
 
Limitations and directions for future research  
The main limitation relates to the number of case companies investigated that hinder the 
generalisability of findings. Hence it would be necessary: i) to increase the number of case studies, and 
subsequently ii) to carry out a wider questionnaire survey. Another limitation concerns the focus of 
this study. The set of sample companies is representative and valuable for achieving the objectives of 
this research, and it allows for results that are not influenced by a specific stage of the supply chain or 
a specific industrial sector.  However, the set of companies is not able to provide deep insights on the 
implications of CSCRM for different stages of the supply chain and sectors. This could be addressed in 
future research works that could focus on vertical analyses to better explain the potential reasons 
underpinning the choices made and the actions undertaken by companies.  
Additionally, another limitation of our sample is represented by the fact that it does not include 
multiple players belonging to the same supply chain. This could be relevant especially when supply 
chains particularly affected by cyber and information risks are concerned (such as the fast moving 
consumer goods sector for the amount of exchanged data, or the pharmaceutical sector for the 
sensitivity of exchanged data). By overcoming this limitation it would be possible to explore the 
implications for the achievement of cyber supply chain resilience in different supply chain contexts. 
Also, it would be interesting to conduct analyses able to shed light on the initiatives and coordination 
efforts for CSCRM within same supply chains at a network level. In fact, our results stimulate 
researchers to deepen the study of the supply chain coordination mechanisms at network level.  
Furthermore, the outcome of the present study opens as a further research stream the investigation on 
the identification of challenges and drivers to establish an efficient and effective CSCRM process for 
enhanced resilience in the context of cyber and information risk. It would be interesting to deepen the 
study of what companies need to do/implement for extending the scope of their CSCRM process 
beyond the dyad and achieve cyber resilience in the whole supply chain, and what kind of factors can 
facilitate the overcoming of the barriers to this. To corroborate this aspect, we deem that investigating 
the relationship between the efforts/investments on CSCRM initiatives and related tangible/intangible 
benefits for supply chain and organizational performance, through empirical evidence, would be 
necessary. This should be carried out also along with the development of a cost-benefit sharing 
framework related to these supply chain relationships. Likewise, the development of appropriate 
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performance measures to drive and enhance cyber resilience in the supply chain would further help, 
beyond the prescriptions and indications already provided by the extant literature. 
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Table 1. Sources of cyber and information risks in the supply chain 
  Malicious Natural/Non-intentional Main Behaviour/Task* 
Internal 
Current employees Current employees 
Forwarding of infected messages; sharing of account details;  
replying to phishing messages; retrieving and storing data on 
uncontrolled devices; being victim of social engineering 
Former employees Former employees Forwarding of infected messages;  
retrieving, storing and disclosing data on uncontrolled devices  
  
Power outages 
NA 
Technical problems 
External 
Suppliers/contractors Suppliers/contractors Unsecured data sharing and transmission 
Customers Customers Unsecured data sharing and transmission 
Competitors 
 
Industrial espionage, misappropriation of data and information 
Foreign nation states Espionage, misappropriation of data and information 
Domestic intelligence 
services Espionage, misappropriation of data and information 
Hackers/Hacktivists Small and large scale cyber attacks  
 
Natural disasters 
NA Power outages 
Technical problems 
*behaviours/tasks can be malicious or non-intentional depending on the approach of the actor 
  
Table 2. Profile and background of the case companies 
 Company Activities Profile 
Number of 
Employees 
(2016) 
Annual 
Turnover 
(2016) 
Geographical 
Reach 
(Suppliers) 
Geographical 
Reach 
(Operations) 
Geographical 
Reach 
(Customers) 
Company 
A 
Manufacturer/supplier 
of consumer goods 
Founded over than 80 years 
ago, the company operates in 
a complex and global network 
of suppliers and customers in 
the consumer goods industry. 
This company heavily relies 
on information and data to be 
shared in the supply chain 
regarding products 
specifications, demand and 
supply capabilities. 
> 250 > £100 M European Global Global 
Company 
B 
Logistics Provider 
(bulk goods) 
Founded around 40 years ago, 
the company is a provider of 
bulk liquid and powder 
transport and logistics 
services. Real-time 
information on shipments to 
ensure end to end visibility 
and transparency to customers 
and shippers is a key success 
factor for the company’s 
operations. 
> 250 £20-50 M National National National and European 
Company 
C 
Logistics Provider 
(palletized and 
packaged goods) 
Founded around 40 years ago, 
this third-party logistics 
provider operates in the Fast 
Moving Consumer Goods 
supply chain. The company 
operates through a network of 
warehouses and partners in a 
dynamic market, which 
requires real time exchange of 
information to ensure an end 
to end efficient and seamless 
logistics service. 
> 250 > £100 M National and European National 
National and 
European 
Company 
D 
International 
Shipping, Chartering, 
and Forwarding 
company  
Founded around 30 years ago, 
the company provides general 
and specialist logistics 
services to companies 
worldwide. They focus also 
on the maritime segment of 
international trade, 
exchanging information and 
performing transactions with 
port operators. 
> 250 £2-10 M National and European 
National and 
European 
National and 
European 
Company 
E Online Retailer 
Founded around 20 years ago, 
the company grew 
considerably with the rise of 
e-commerce. They rely 
heavily on electronic 
transactions for selling 
products worldwide through 
their fulfilment centres in 
Europe, China and U.S. 
> 250 > £100 M 
Asia and 
European National 
National and 
European 
 
  
Table 3. Assessment of the empirical validity of the research (based on Yin, 2003; Reuter et al., 2010) 
 
 
 
 
 
Criterion Research Phase 
 Design Case Selection Data Collection Data Analysis 
Construct Validity 
 
Establishment of a 
chain of evidence 
linking the research 
objectives to the 
protocol and to the 
results, questionnaire 
developed basing on 
the literature 
NA Involvement of 
multiple interviewers 
and multiple sources 
of information  
Informants involved 
to seek feedback and 
observations and 
review the case 
protocol,  
demonstration of the 
convergence of 
patterns from 
multiple data sources 
Internal Validity 
 
Research built on 
recognized principles 
of CSCRM and 
related literature, 
acting as foundation 
to identify critical 
factors and 
relationships driving 
behaviours  
Sampling criteria as 
part of the case study 
protocol 
Multiple informants, 
multiple sources of 
information, use of 
templates with charts 
and tables 
Pattern matching 
within and across the 
cases, triangulation 
of data, reaching 
agreement among 
researchers on the 
outcomes of the 
analyses  
External Validity 
 
Research objectives 
driving the design of 
the sampling criteria, 
multiple sample 
criteria aligned with 
the scope of the study 
to create a coherent 
sample 
Clear description of 
case companies’ 
background and 
profile 
Comparison of data 
gathered from 
companies operating 
in different supply 
chains and different 
stages of the supply 
chain 
NA 
Reliability 
 
Case study protocol 
developed and 
validated 
Clear, structured and 
explicit sampling 
criteria  
Shared interview 
protocol for all 
interviewers, creation 
of case study 
database 
Formalized coding, 
involvement of 
multiple researchers 
in the analysis 
  
 
Table 4. SCRM and CSCRM at the case Companies 
  
 Company A Company B Company C Company D Company E 
Approach to SCRM Proactive  Reactive Mixed (proactive + 
reactive) 
Proactive Mixed (proactive, but 
mainly reactive) 
Level of Centralization 
of SCRM  
Business Unit Headquarters 
(support to business 
units) 
Headquarters 
(support to business 
units to manage local 
points of failure) 
Local Headquarters 
Tools for SCRM Risk Assessment and 
Scenario Analysis 
Contingency Plans Business Continuity 
Plan, Scenario 
Analysis and 
Decision Trees 
No specific tool  No specific tools 
Ownership of the SCRM 
Process 
Operations and 
Market Operations  
Health and Safety 
(responsible and 
accountable), 
Finance (involved) 
Top management 
(sponsor), 
Operations and IT 
(responsible and 
accountable), Human 
resources (involved) 
Top management 
(review), 
operations/logistics 
(highly involved), 
Finance (focus on 
currency issues) 
Top management, 
operations/logistics 
Ownership of the 
CSCRM Process 
IT, Operations and 
Market Operations  
IT and Finance  Top management 
(informed), IT, 
Finance and Legal 
(responsible 
/accountable), 
Human resources 
(involved) 
Top Management and 
IT 
Supply Chain 
Director 
(responsible/accounta
ble), IT, Finance and 
Purchasing 
(involved) 
Table 5. Perception of the main cyber and information risks in the supply chain 
 
Probability of Occurrence  
(  High /  Medium /  Low) 
Impact on Business 
(  High /  Medium /  Low) 
Company 
A 
Company 
B 
Company 
C 
Company 
D 
Company 
E 
Company 
A 
Company 
B 
Company 
C 
Company 
D 
Company 
E 
Customer 
records 
compromised 
 
 
 
 
 
     
Employee 
records 
compromised 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Supplier records 
compromised           
Data 
breach/disclosure           
Theft of 
Intellectual 
Property 
  
 
NA 
 
 
 
 
NA 
 
Crash of website 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Failure of 
company’s IT 
network 
 
   
 
 
 
   
 
  
  
       
    
    
     
    
    
       
Table 6. Main sources of information and cyber risks in the supply chain 
  Malicious Natural/Non-intentional 
Internal 
  A B C D E   A B C D E 
Current employees x x x   x Current employees x x x x  x 
Former employees x x x x  x Former employees   x x    
            Power outages     x    
            Technical problems     x x   
External 
  A B C D E   A B C D E 
Current suppliers/contractors x x      Current suppliers/contractors x x x   x 
Former suppliers/contractors   x      Former suppliers/contractors x x x   x 
Current customers          Current customers     x    
Former customers     x    Former customers     x    
Competitors   x x   x Competitors   x x    
Foreign nation states       x   Natural disasters         x 
Domestic intelligence 
services/espionage 
      x  
 
Power outages         
 
x 
Hackers/Hacktivists     x x  x Technical problems         x 
 
  
Table 7. Security safeguards and initiatives  
 
Company 
A 
Company 
B 
Company 
C 
Company 
D 
Company 
E 
Organizational 
initiatives 
Information security strategy aligned 
with the specific needs of the business X  X  X 
Employ a chief information security 
officer     X 
Conduct personnel background checks   X X  
Specific data and information 
insurance    X  
Training and 
internal 
awareness 
Employee security awareness training 
programme (cyber hygiene) X  X  X 
Procedures for protecting intellectual 
property X     
Compliance 
and external 
awareness 
Require customers to comply with 
your privacy and security policies X X X X  
Require suppliers/contractors to 
comply with your privacy and security 
policies 
X  X X X 
Conduct supply chain partners security 
audits X     
Collaborative 
agreements/arrangements with supply 
chain partners for security 
X  X   
Event 
Management 
Business continuity and disaster 
recovery plans X X X X X 
Incident management process X X X X X 
Communication procedures with 
involved supply chain partners X X X X X 
Data 
Management 
Accurate record of personnel handling 
data X  X  X 
Secure data access and control 
measures 
X  X X X 
Privileged user access X X X X X 
Programme to identity sensitive assets X  X   
IT security 
tools 
Encryption of email messages X X  X  
Intrusion prevention systems (IPS) X X X X X 
Data loss prevention tools   X X X 
Mobile security strategy and device 
management (application awareness) X X X X X 
Geo-location and geo-fencing controls 
(firewall and VPN) X X   X 
Data and URL filtering (antivirus and 
antispam) X  X X X 
IT operational 
resilience 
Internal recovery plan process  X X X X X 
Collaborative recovery plan process 
with supply chain partners X  X X  
Multiple data backup X X X X X 
Geographical distributed datacentres X   X X 
Virtual networks / IT infrastructures   X X X 
Relying on Cloud systems 
orchestrators   X X X 
Uninterruptible power supplies / 
power banks X X X X X 
 
